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III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-3-l 02(3)(j). The case was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78A-l 03(2)(j). 
IV. ST A TEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Did the trial court err in concluding that the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation ("Tribe") is a necessary and indispensable party as to causes of 
action which are state law claims brought against Tribal officials for ultra vires acts as 
well as other parties who are not affiliated with the Tribe, which occurred outside of Ute 
Tribal land and within the State of Utah? 
The standard for review is an abuse of discretion standard. See Seftel v. Capital 
City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Although not necessary to preserve 
this issue, this issue was preserved in the trial court. R. 198-200, 203-217, 259-272. 
B. Did the trial court err in not concluding that the state's interests in 
promoting fair and competitive business activity free from unlawful interference from 
foreign powers, by protecting non-Indian state residents, who compose roughly 95% of 
the area population, state small businesses, and the oil and gas industry, which is the 
lifeblood of the local economy, outweigh the interests of the Tribe in regulating non-
Indian business activities that occur within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land, the 
jurisdiction of the Tribe, and within the jurisdiction of the State of Utah? 
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This is a jurisdictional issue and the standard for review is under a correction of 
error standard. The trial court's ruling is given no deference. Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT 
App 199, 17, 29 P.3d 13. This issue was preserved in the trial court. R. 1483-1499. 
C. Did the trial court err in granting the Utah R. of Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss filed by various defendants? 
The standard for review is under a correction of error standard. The trial court's 
ruling is given no deference. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 
P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) (cited authorities omitted). 
As it relates to the tort of extortion, the trial court found as a matter of law that the 
State of Utah does not recognize this cause of action. This issue of first impression 
presents a question of law and the trial court is given no deference. Id. These issues 
were preserved in the trial court. R. 664-685, 689-703. 
D. Did the trial court err in concluding that the tribal officials are immune 
from suit, where the conduct complained of violates state law, occurred outside of Ute 
Tribal land within the State of Utah, and outside the jurisdiction of the Tribe? 
This is a jurisdictional issue and the standard for review is under a correction of 
error standard. The trial court's ruling is given no deference. Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT 
App 199, t7. This issue was preserved in the trial court. R. 1151-1179. 
E. Did the trial court err in finding that the Tribe did not waive sovereign 
immunity, by making a general appearance in state court and seeking affirmative relief 
from the state court beyond a dismissal on the grounds of jurisdiction? 
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The standard for review is under a correction of error standard and the trial court's 
ruling is given no deference. State v. Reber, 2007 UT 36 'fl8, 171 P.3d 406. This issue 
was preserved in the trial court. R. 1458-1465 
F. Did the trial court err by not allowing supplemental pleadings, where 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants sought leave to plead supplemental facts which did not occur until 
well after the complaint was drafted and during periods the action was stayed in state 
court? 
A Utah R. of Civ. P. 15( d) motion is "addressed to the sound discretion of the 
court, and leave to serve a supplemental pleading 'should be liberally granted unless good 
reason exists for denying leave."' Sw. Nurseries, LLC v. Florists Mut. Ins., Inc., 266 F. 
Supp. 2d 1253, 1256, (D. Colo. 2003) (quoted authority omitted). "Refusing leave to 
amend is generally only justified upon a showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the 
opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed, or futility of amendment." Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 
1365 (10th Cir. 1993). This issue was preserved in the trial court. R. 1469-1482. 
V. STATEMENT OF STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
1. 
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Utah R. of Civ. P. 19: 
Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
See Aplt. Addendum Page 2 
2. UT AH CONST. art. XII § 19 [Blacklisting forbidden] 
Each person in Utah isfree to obtain and enjoy employment 
whenever possible, and a person or c01poration, or their agent, 
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servant, or employee may not maliciously inte1fere with any person 
from obtaining employment or enjoying employment already 
obtained from any other person or corporation. 
3. UT AH CONST. art. XVI § 4 [Exchange of blacklists prohibited] 
The exchange of black lists by rai /road companies, or other 
corporations, associations or persons is prohibited. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs filed suit in the trial court asserting several state law claims, including 
tortious interference with economic relations, extortion, unlawful restraint of trade, 
blacklisting and civil conspiracy against Defendants Cesspooch, LaR.ose and Wopsock, 
as well as other defendants, who were added in the amended complaint, including 
Newfield Exploration Company, Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC, 
L.C. Welding & Construction, Inc. Scamp Excavation, Inc., Huffman Enterprises, Inc., 
LaRose Construction Company, Inc., and D.Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. Plaintiffs' relief 
requested included a request for declaratory judgment that "the assertion of Tribal 
jurisdiction as a defense to Plaintiffs' claims is unavailing, as the Tribe lacks jurisdiction" 
over certain land categories set forth in the pleading. 
On September 20, 2013, the Tribe removed the case to federal court. Following 
the filing of the removal notice, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting remand to the state 
court. On July 1, 2014, the Federal District Court granted Plaintiffs' motion (the 
"Remand Order"). The Tribe appealed the Remand Order to the 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals. By opinion entered August 13, 2015, the Remand Order was upheld. The trial 
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court granted motions to dismiss filed by various Defendants resulting in the dismissal of 
all of Plaintiffs' claims on May 12, 2016. 
A. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Procedural Facts 
The Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Original 
Complaint") was filed by Plaintiffs in this matter on April 5, 2013. R. 1-21. The Original 
Complaint identified four Defendants ( collectively referred to as the "Initial 
Defendants"), the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (the "Tribe"), 
Dino Cesspooch, individually and as a Ute Tribal Employment Rights Office ("UTERO") 
Commissioner, Jackie LaRose, individually and as a UTERO Commissioner, and Sheila 
Wopsock, individually and as the UTERO Director. R. 1-21. 
The complaint sought declaratory judgment with respect to the Tribe's and tribal 
official's exercise of authority over non-Indians in certain categories ofland. R. 1-21. 
The complaint then alleged two state law causes of action, tortious interference with 
economic relations and extortion, against the tribal officials for their ultra vires actions 
which damaged Plaintiffs. R. 1-21. 
On May 1, 2013, J. Preston Stieff filed an Entry of Special Appearance and a 
motion to dismiss the complaint on behalf of the Initial Defendants. R. 198-200, 203-217. 
The Initial Defendants asserted four basic arguments to support dismissal, including that 
the court lacked jurisdiction due to insufficient process and insufficient service of 
process, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of a valid waiver of 
sovereign immunity, the court lacked jurisdiction over necessary and indispensable 
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parties, and the court lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies. R. 203-217. 
The Initial Defendants requested that the state court interpret and make 
conclusions of law related to the issue of sovereign immunity. R. 203-217. This included 
requests that the state court analyze and interpret the waiver provisions of the UTERO 
Ordinance, and the Law and Order Code of the Ute Indian Tribe. R. 203-217. Affidavits 
were presented to the state couti and it was requested that the state court dismiss the case 
based on the "facts and legal authorities" cited in the memorandum supporting the motion 
to dismiss. R. 218-220, 203-217. 
The Initial Defendants also filed two motions requesting pro hac vice admission 
for two attorneys for the Tribe. R. 398-400, 405-407 and those motions were granted by 
respective orders on June 11, 2013. R. 419-422. On July 8, 2013, Patrick Boice filed his 
Notice of Substitution of Counsel, for Defendants Cesspooch, LaRose and Wopsock. R. 
427-428. 
Plaintiffs filed their motion requesting leave to amend the complaint on July 17, 
2013. R. 431-435. The amended complaint ("Amended Complaint") seeks a declaration 
that "the assertion of Tribal jurisdiction as a defense to Plaintiffs' claims is unavailing, as 
the Tribe lacks jurisdiction" over certain land categories set forth in the amended 
complaint, and then asserts several state law claims, including tortious interference with 
economic relations, extortion, unlawful restraint of trade, blacklisting and civil 
conspiracy against Defendants Cesspooch, LaRose and W opsock, as well as other 
Defendants, who were added in the Amended Complaint, including Newfield Exploration 
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Company, Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC, L.C. Welding & 
Construction, Inc., Scamp Excavation, Inc., Huffman Enterprises, Inc., LaRose 
Construction Company, Inc. and D.Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. R. 548-579. 
Not all Defendants are implicated in each cause of action and no causes of action 
are asserted against the Tribe other than defensive declaratory relief nor are any damages 
sought from the Tribe pursuant to the Amended Complaint. R. 548-579. The sole relief 
sought respecting the Tribe is defensive declaratory relief that assertion of Tribal 
jurisdiction in certain land categories outside the jurisdiction of the Tribe does not defeat 
Plaintiffs' state law claims against the other parties. R. 548-579. 
On July 22, 2013, the state court held the hearing on the Initial Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. The parties argued every element of the motion, including issues as to 
service, sovereign immunity, indispensable parties and exhaustion of administrative 
remedies. R. 198-200, 203-217. In terms of service, the Tribe argued, among other 
things, that service of process on the Tribe would need to be completed through the Ute 
Tribal Court, that all six (6) members of the Business Committee (the governing body of 
the Tribe) must be served, that the summons and complaint must be domesticated by the 
Ute Tribal Court and that the Ute Tribal Court must be petitioned to authorize service. R. 
371-379. 
The state court rendered a partial decision rejecting the Tribe's argument as to 
service requirements on the Tribe, by allowing service by mail on the Tribe and 
Defendant Wopsock. R. 508-507. Defendants Cesspooch and LaRose had already been 
personally served in May 2013. 
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The court also afforded all parties the opportunity to brief the issue of whether the 
Initial Defendants had made a general appearance rather than a special appearance by 
including items other than service issues in their motion to dismiss. The parties were 
allowed until August 2, 2013 to brief the issue. R. 508-511. Plaintiffs, the Tribe, and 
Defendants Cesspooch, LaRose and Wopsock subsequently briefed the issue and it was 
pending before the trial court at the time of the removal to federal court. R. 484-490, 493-
495, 498-499. At the July hearing, the trial court then took the remaining issues under 
advisement. 
The Initial Defendants did not oppose the motion to amend the complaint, and, on 
August 16, 2013, the state court entered its order permitting the amending of the 
complaint. R. 519-520. The Amended Complaint was served on Defendants, and returns 
were filed with the state court. R. 526-530, 533-536, 537-544, 582-603, 607-618, 622-
625. 
The Tribe filed a notice of removal on September 20, 2013. R. 629-636. Plaintiffs 
then filed a motion requesting remand to the state court. In granting remand, the federal 
court observed that "th[ e] defendants ... submitted and argued a nearly identical motion 
to dismiss in th[at] [ c ]ourt as the motion originally filed and argued before the state 
court." R. 648-655. The court further opined, "Thus, it seems defendants held nothing 
back in an effort to dispose of the matter in the first instance before the state court." R. 
648-655. 
Defendants appealed the Remand Order to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Defendants also filed a motion in the state court to stay the action. On October 9, 2014, 
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the action was stayed by the trial court during the pend ency of the appeal of the Remand 
Order. R. 738-742, 895-900. By opinion entered August 13, 2015, the Remand Order was 
upheld. R. 1031-104 7. The trial court granted motions to dismiss filed by various 
defendants resulting in the dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' claims on March 28, 2016. R. 
1757-1794. 
2. Facts Pleaded in Amended Complaint 
The Amended Complaint consists of 33 pages. The following is a summary of the 
facts alleged and assumed true for purposes of the Utah R. of Civ. P. 12 motions granted 
by the district court and relevant to the issues on appeal. 
Plaintiffs are persons and corporations domiciled in and doing business in 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties. R. 549-550. Plaintiffs provide dirt, sand, and gravel 
products, and lease heavy equipment (the ''Products"). R. 553-554. Plaintiffs' business 
activities do not require them to access or even pass through Ute Tribal land, with 
operations confined to fee land outside of Ute Tribal land as defined under Hagen v. 
Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994). R. 553-554. 
The Tribe is a federally recognized tribe with reservation lands located in 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties. Defendant Dino Cesspooch ("Commissioner Cesspooch" 
or "Cesspooch") is an appointed UTERO Commissioner, and is sued in his individual as 
well as his official capacity. R. 550. Defendant Jackie LaRose ("Commissioner LaRose" 
or "LaRose") is an appointed UTERO Commissioner, and is sued in his individual as 
well as his official capacity. R. 550. Defendant Sheila Wopsock ("Director Wopsock" or 
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"Wopsock") is the appointed Director of the UTERO Commission, and is sued in her 
individual as well as her official capacity. R. 550. 
Defendants, Newfield Production Company and Newfield Rocky Mountain, Inc. 
are Delaware corporations, Defendant Newfield RMI, LLC is a Delaware limited liability 
company, and Defendant Newfield Drilling Services Inc. is a Utah corporation, and all of 
these entities (referred to collectively herein as "Newfield") are under common 
ownership and control, and are engaged in the exploration, development and production 
of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids with production regions, employees, 
operations, and doing business in Duchesne and Uintah Counties. R. 550-551. 
Defendant L.C. Welding & Construction, Inc. ("L.C. Welding") is a Utah 
corporation. R. 551. Defendant Scamp Excavation, Inc. ("Scamp") is a Utah corporation. 
R. 5 51. Defendant Huff man Enterprises, Inc. ("Huffman") is a Utah corporation. R. 5 51. 
Defendant LaRose Construction Company, Inc. ("LaRose Construction") is a Utah 
corporation. R. 551. Defendant D.Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. ("D.Ray Enterprises") is a 
Utah limited liability company. R. 552. All of these entities, like Newfield do business in 
Utah and are subject to jurisdiction in Utah. R. 550-552. 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties are located in Utah's Uintah Basin. R. 552. The 
major economic force of the Uintah Basin is the oil and gas industry. R. 552. A majority 
of the revenue earned by Plaintiffs is generated by providing the Products to oil and gas 
companies. R. 553. 
There are approximately 54,000 residents of Uintah and Duchesne Counties. R. 
552. The Uintah and Ouray Reservation of the Ute Indian Tribe is located within the 
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Uintah Basin. R. 552. There are approximately 3,000 enrolled members of the Tribe. R. 
553. 
Since in or about September 2012, Cesspooch has harassed, threatened, bullied, 
and intimidated Plaintiffs by threatening to utilize his position as a UTERO 
Commissioner to "shut down" Plaintiffs' businesses if UTERO certification was not 
obtained. R. 554. Cesspooch's threats subjected Plaintiffs to duress because oil and gas 
companies, including Newfield, have" ... cooperated with and assisted Cesspooch by 
refusing work and to do business with companies similar to Plaintiffs' ... " effectively 
putting these companies out of business. R. 554. 
Plaintiffs explained that their business operations were confined to private fee land 
and that they do not access or even travel through Ute Tribal land in their business 
operations. R. 554-555. Despite this, Cesspooch persisted in and escalated his threats, 
including threats to impound Plaintiffs' heavy equipment that was located on private fee 
land, not within Ute Tribal land. R. 555. Under duress and in an effort to save their 
businesses, Plaintiffs obtained UTERO Certification in or about November 2012. R. 555-
556. 
Even after UTERO Certification was obtained, Cesspooch persisted in his threats. 
R. 556. Plaintiffs were accosted by Cesspooch at the China Star Restaurant located in 
Roosevelt, Utah. R. 556. Cesspooch claimed his signature on certification documents 
issued to Plaintiffs were no good and his signature had been forged. R. 556. At a later 
meeting at another restaurant in Roosevelt, Cesspooch did an about-face and informed 
Plaintiffs that their UTERO Certification was good. R. 557. 
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In February 2013, while Plaintiffs were traveling on Highway 40 in Roosevelt, 
they were forced to pull over by Cesspooch into a local business parking lot located 
within Roosevelt. R. 557-558. Cesspooch then attempted to extort Plaintiffs. R. 557-558. 
A short time after Plaintiffs refused Cesspooch's extortionist demands, Director 
Wopsock sent correspondence accusing Plaintiffs of submitting false and inaccurate 
official tribal, state and federal documents. R. 558. On March 20, 2015, Wopsock 
demanded that all oil and gas companies cease doing business with Plaintiffs. R. 558. 
Wopsock's demands were not limited to Ute Tribal lands. R. 558. 
Newfield cooperated and complied with Wopsock's directives and, by email dated 
March 22, 2013, informed Plaintiffs that it would no longer utilize their Products. R. 558. 
This was not limited to business conducted on Ute Tribal land, R. 558, and the situs of 
Plaintiffs' business operations is exclusively outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 554-555. 
Newfield has also refused to do business with any third party who utilizes Plaintiffs' 
Products. R. 559. Newfield has informed Plaintiffs that it will not do business with 
Plaintiffs or work with anyone who does business with Plaintiffs based on their 
cooperation with the UTERO officials. 1 R. 559. Newfield's cooperation with the 
unlawful and ultra vires actions of tribal officials in blacklisting and boycotting Plaintiffs 
is the direct and proximate cause of substantial damages to Plaintiffs. R. 559. Plaintiffs 
discussed this matter with Cesspooch who was unable to provide Plaintiffs with a single 
1 UTERO officials and tribal officials arc used interchangeably throughout this brief. 
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reason why the UTERO officials te1minated Plaintiffs' businesses, and had Plaintiffs 
blacklisted and boycotted by the local oil and gas industry. R. 559. 
Cesspooch has threatened third parties that he would "shut down" their businesses 
if they leased any equipment from Plaintiffs. R. 560. Nelson Construction, Inc. informed 
Plaintiffs that Wopsock demanded that they not utilize Plaintiffs' rock crushing 
equipment that is located on private ground that is not on Ute Tribal land. R. 560. 
UTERO officials have engaged in a pattern and practice of extorting money from 
area businesses by threatening to "shut down" their operations if the businesses do not 
pay the UTERO officials. R. 560. For example, Cesspooch, a convicted felon, has 
demanded 10% of area businesses' gross revenues in return for "keep[ing] them working 
and UTERO compliant." R. 560. UTERO officials dictate to oil and gas companies which 
contractors will be awarded bids and which contractors are not to be used. R. 561. These 
directives are not limited to work performed on Ute Tribal land, and have resulted in 
substantial harm to Plaintiffs' enterprises outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 562. 
LaRose, at all relevant times, owned an interest in an oil & gas service company, 
LaRose Construction. R. 561. LaRose received bribes and work from Huffman, a 
competitor of Plaintiffs, in exchange for LaRose's abusing his position as a UTERO 
Commissioner and wrongfully diverting business from Plaintiffs to Huffman. R. 561. 
LaRose, L.C. Welding, and Scamp conspired to receive an economic interest in a sand 
and gravel pit located outside of tribal land which commenced operation after Plaintiffs 
were "shut down" by Wopsock, Cesspooch, and LaRose. R. 561. Wopsock, Cesspooch, 
and LaRose conspired to abuse their UTERO positions to destroy Plaintiffs' businesses in 
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an effort to eliminate competition and because Plaintiffs refused to pay Cesspooch's 
extortionist demands. R. 562. LaRose Construction and D.Ray Enterprises participated in 
the conspiracy and derived a substantial economic benefit by eliminating Plaintiffs as a 
competitor of the aforementioned sand and gravel pit. R. 571. 
Defendants conspired together and acted with improper purpose and/or through 
improper means with said action exceeding the limits of the jurisdiction the Ute Tribe. R. 
568. This was done to promote Defendants' own business interests resulting in injury to 
Plaintiffs. R. 568. Defendants intentionally and maliciously engaged in a conspiracy for 
the purpose of causing damage to Plaintiffs and obtained unlawful financial gain. R. 573. 
All acts and occurrences complained of in the Amended Complaint occurred on fee land 
outside of Ute Tribal land as defined under Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (I 994). R. 562. 
3. Supplemental Facts 
Plaintiffs sought to supplement the facts set forth in the Amended Complaint 
pursuant to Utah R. of Civ. P. 15(d). These allegations relate to events that occurred 
during the lengthy period the matter was stayed while on appeal to the I 0th Circuit, and 
are summarized below. 
Newfield demanded on numerous occasions that no subcontractors utilize the 
Plaintiffs' Products. R. 1476-1480. Newfield threatened that any subcontractors found 
utilizing Plaintiffs' Products would be prohibited from doing subcontract work for 
Newfield. R. 1476. 
Plaintiffs' sand and gravel pits were located where the Products could be 
transported to Newfield oil and gas production locations for less than competitors, and, 
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after transferring a sand and gravel pit lease to a third party lessee, Newfield began 
purchasing products from that lessee. R. 1476-1477. UTERO officials and employees 
have continued to threaten and harass any third party seen leaving a sand and gravel pit 
operated by Plaintiffs, this harassment has taken place on county roads located non-Tribal 
land and threats include blacklisting any third party seen leaving Plaintiffs' sand and 
gravel pits. R. 1477. The threats are made regardless of whether the Products are to be 
used by oil and gas production companies or for private projects on non-Tribal land, 
county, city or state projects, and the threats and harassment have resulted in Plaintiffs 
losing sales. R. 1477-1478. For example, C&R Crane was blacklisted by UTERO 
officials, with the aid and cooperation of oil and gas production companies such as 
Newfield, after one of C&R Crane's employees was harassed and threatened by tribal 
officials after leaving one of Plaintiffs' pits. R. 1478. 
Kaufusi Excavating, an excavation company, was not allowed to bid on work for 
Newfield after being blacklisted by UTERO Officials for leasing Plaintiffs' equipment. 
In a Newfield bid walk that occurred in December of 2015, the only companies allowed 
by Newfield to bid on the project were Defendants LaRose Construction, Huffman, and 
L.C. Welding. R. 1478. Defendants have been effective in eliminating competition. R. 
1478-1479. 
A private investigative firm commissioned by the Tribe submitted a report 
confirming that UTERO Officials, acting ultra vires, have made unlawful monetary 
demands on local small businesses, like Plaintiffs, catering to the oil and gas industry. R. 
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1479. Cesspooch and LaRose have obstructed investigations and some Defendants' files 
have been removed from the UTERO office. R. 14 79. 
On January 8, 2015, the Tribe sent UTERO demands to all employers "engaging 
in commercial or employment activity within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation" that non-Indians must first be terminated if there is any reduction in 
the employer's workforce. R. 1480. This demand is made of companies, including 
Plaintiffs, that operate within exterior boundaries but outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 1480. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Tribe is not a necessary or indispensable party as to lawsuits brought to 
enjoin ultra vi res acts of tribal officials that violate state law and occur outside of Ute 
Tribal land. This matter involves tribal officials in extorting and blacklisting Plaintiffs, 
and engaging in other noncompetitive measures. It is not a critical interest of the Tribe to 
facilitate such acts, especially where those acts occur outside of Ute Tribal land. Indeed, 
attempting to regulate business activities which occur outside of Ute Tribal land has 
nothing to do with protecting the Tribe's self-governance, and these activities are clearly 
within the purview of local, state, and federal bodies, not the Tribe. 
2. The State of Utah's interest in promoting fair and competitive business 
activity outweighs the interest of the Tribe in regulating non-Indian business activities 
that occur within the state, and outside of Ute Tribal land. Allowing tribal officials to 
regulate businesses outside of Ute Tribal land results in enterprises operating exclusively 
intrastate being subjected to regulatory control by a foreign power, and infringes upon the 
jurisdiction of the state. 
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3. The allegations set forth in the 32-page Amended Complaint provide 
sufficient notice to meet the elements of the tortious interference claim, including that 
Newfield assisted tribal officials in unlawfully boycotting and blacklisting Plaintiffs, and 
threatening to similarly blacklist third parties who chose to do business with Plaintiffs. 
The alleged purposes of this activity were to eliminate competitors of the official's own 
businesses or those of their benefactors and to retaliate against Plaintiffs for their refusal 
to be extorted. The unlawful threats would have been meaningless but for Newfield's 
assistance in enforcing them against Plaintiffs. 
4. Utah's recognition of a cause of action for extortion is a matter of first 
impression. Currently, several causes of action exist for claims akin to extortion, 
including an individual's right to sue for losses caused by theft, and the Court should 
recognize a private cause of action for extortion. 
5. The Amended Complaint is clear that the arrangement between tribal 
officials and Newfield was an unlawful restraint of trade, was not limited to Ute Tribal 
land, and included conduct against Plaintiffs as well as third parties. Plaintiffs allege per 
se violations of Utah antitrust laws, including unlawful boycotting and bid rigging, and 
the Amended Complaint is not only sufficient but detailed. 
6. In rejecting the blacklisting claim, the trial court reasoned that Newfield 
followed the direction ofUTERO by not using Plaintiffs for work completed on Tribal 
land. This finding misapprehends the facts alleged by Plaintiffs, which are that Plaintiffs' 
business operations are conducted exclusively outside of Tribal land. Moreover, Newfield 
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cooperated with UTERO officials in blacklisting Plaintiffs and third parties who were 
doing business with Plaintiffs. 
7. The Amended Complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish the elements 
of civil conspiracy. As enumerated therein, UTERO officials asked Newfield to 
discontinue using Plaintiffs' Products or third-parties who utilized Plaintiffs' Products, 
and Newfield assisted tribal officials in committing their tortious and illegal activities. 
8. Defendants D.Ray Enterprises and Larose Construction participated in the 
conspiracy in order to eliminate Plaintiffs as a competitor and to retaliate for Plaintiffs' 
refusal to be extorted. The state court has jurisdiction over these Defendants for their 
ultra vi res acts in violation of state law, which occurred within the State of Utah and 
outside of Ute Tribal land. 
9. Abundant precedent provides that tribal officials are liable in state court for 
damages for ultra vires acts even though a tribe may have sovereign immunity. The tribal 
officials' wrongful conduct outside of Ute Tribal land is beyond the jurisdiction and valid 
authority of the Ute Tribe, and, thus, the tribal officials have no immunity from suit. 
I 0. While it is an issue of first impression in Utah, persuasive authority 
provides that when a tribe seeks affirmative relief from a state or federal court, the tribe 
waives sovereign immunity. In addition to invoking sovereign immunity on behalf of the 
Tribe, the Tribe sought dismissal of the entire case, contending the Tribe is a necessary 
and indispensable party, invited the trial court to interpret provisions of the UTERO 
Ordinance in consideration of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and filed for a stay. 
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The state court must necessarily have jurisdiction to grant the affirmative relief the Tribe 
requested, and the Tribe waived sovereign immunity. 
11. Permitting Plaintiffs to file the supplemental pleading in this matter would 
not have caused undue delay or prejudice, and should have been granted by the trial court. 
This is especially true where the wrongs complained of are continuing and occurred 
during the lengthy period the action was stayed by the trial court, at Defendants' behest. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court erred in concluding that the Tribe is a necessary and 
indispensable party, as to causes of action which are state law claims brought 
against Tribal officials for ultra vires acts as well as other parties who are not 
affiliated with the Tribe, which occurred outside of Ute Tribal land and within the 
State of Utah, leaving Plaintiffs with no recourse. 
Utah R. of Civ. P. l 9(a) requires the joinder of necessary parties. To determine 
whether a party is necessary, a court should consider the two general factors in rule 19(a). 
First, a party is necessary if in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among 
those already parties. Utah R. Civ. P. l 9(a) (1 ). Second, a party is necessary if he claims 
an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the 
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect 
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed 
interes . Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990). "The burden of 
presenting specific facts and reasoning that lead to the conclusion that a party is a 
Page 19 of 54 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
necessary or indispensable pa11y is on the party attempting to persuade the court that 
parties are necessary." Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119,, 
38, 208 P.3d 1077 (cited authority omitted). 
In granting the Tribe's motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the Tribe is a 
necessary and indispensable party under Utah R. of Civ. P. 19, opining, "The inquiry is 
whether the Tribe claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in its absence may as a practical matter impair or impede 
its ability to protect that interest." R. 1767. The trial court found that the ability to issue 
the "directives" at issue is a "critical interest of the Tribe". R. 1768. 
The said directives are mandates that oil and gas production companies, including 
Newfield, refuse to do business with Plaintiffs, R. 558, even though Plaintiffs operate 
outside of Ute Tribal land and their Products are used outside of Ute Tribal land, R. 553-
55, and, further, that Newfield refuse to do business with any third party doing business 
with Plaintiffs. R. 559. As reiterated throughout the Amended Complaint, not only do the 
business activities at issue take place outside of Ute Tribal land, generally, R. 548-579, 
but the purpose for the directives was to punish Plaintiffs for refusing to pay Tribal 
officials' extortionist demands. R. 558, 569. Additionally, the directives are not limited to 
a prohibition against use of Plaintiffs' Products on tribal ground. R. 553. 
The trial court's analysis that the regulated conduct occurred on Ute Tribal land 
conflicts with the facts set forth throughout the Amended Complaint. Generally, R. 548-
579. The directives are a blanket blacklist/boycott of Plaintiffs regardless of the location 
where the Products may be used. It is not a "critical interest" of the Tribe to facilitate 
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Tribal officials' extortion of businesses that operate exclusively outside of Ute Tribal 
land or to regulate Products that are utilized outside of Ute Tribal land. Regulatory 
authority within the State of Utah and outside of Ute Tribal land falls under the purview 
of local, state, and, in some instances, federal regulatory bodies. 
The trial court's holding is catastrophic to the interests of Plaintiffs and other 
business concerns providing products or services in the Uintah Basin. It shrouds tribal 
officials, acting ultra vires, and their co-conspirators with sovereign immunity, and 
allows them to continue to extort, threaten, harass, and damage, with impunity, every 
business which will not capitulate to their edicts, even though the businesses operate 
solely outside of Ute Tribal land. Further, if the Tribe were a necessary party for every 
action commenced against a tribal official, no action against a tribal official would be 
viable. This is contrary to well established precedent. 
The UTERO officials are not entitled to immunity for actions undertaken that are 
beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribe. For purposes of the motions before the trial court, 
the facts that the officials acted outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the Ute Tribe must 
be assumed true. R. 562. 
In Puyallup Tribe v. Dep 't of Game of the State of Washington, 433 U.S. 165, 168-
171, 97 S. Ct. 2616, 2619-2620 (1977), the Court held that a suit to enjoin violations of 
state law by individual tribal members is permissible and does not implicate sovereign 
immunity. The Court further suggested that this includes suits against tribal officials 
brought in state court. Id. at 171-173. Even though the defendants in Puyallup Tribe, 
supra, were not tribal officials, the Court cited it in finding a tribal governor not immune 
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from a suit seeking relief against enforcement of a tribal ordinance. See Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 1677 (1978). 
Consistently, in Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian 
Nation, 498 U.S. 505, 514, 111 S. Ct. 905,912 (1991), the Court stated, "In view of our 
conclusion with respect to sovereign immunity of the Tribe from suit by the State, 
Oklahoma complains that, in effect, decisions such as Moe and Colville give them a right 
without any remedy. There is no doubt that sovereign immunity bars the State from 
pursuing the most efficient remedy, but we are not persuaded that it lacks any adequate 
alternatives. We have never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe are not liable 
for damages in actions brought by the State." 
An analysis on point is set forth in Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075 
(9th Cir. 2013). In Maxwell, the court reasoned that tribal sovereign immunity derives 
from the same common law principles that shape state and federal sovereign immunity. 
Id. at 1087-88. A suit brought against individual officers in their individual capacities, as 
in the instant case, does not implicate sovereign immunity. Id. 
More examples include holdings that sovereign immunity does not extend to tribal 
officials when acting outside their authority in violation of state law. See 1J1m1p Hotels 
& Casino Resorts Dev. Co., LLC v. Rocow, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1215 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. May 2, 2005). In N. States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux 
Indian Cmty., 991 F.2d 458,462, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 7698, ,I,I 11-14 (8th Cir. 1993), 
the court held that sovereign immunity does not protect tribal officers acting beyond the 
scope of the authority the tribe was capable of bestowing on them. In the instant case, 
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Plaintiffs have alleged that the tribal officials are acting beyond the scope of the authority 
the Tribe is capable of bestowing, and in violation of state law. R. 562. 
The trial court reasoned a" ... determination by the Court that the UTERO 
officials' act of sending the directive to Newfield was wrongful is potentially prejudicial 
to the Tribe." R. 1768-1769. The trial court continued that this could be prejudicial to the 
Tribe's ability to regulate its affairs, the Tribe could ban any person or company from 
doing business on Tribal ground for any reason, and the directives at issue could create a 
significant prejudice against a key interest in tribal self-governance. R. 1769. It is 
expressly clear from the allegations in the Amended Complaint that Plaintiffs do not do 
business on tribal ground and the directives at issue were not limited to a prohibition of 
utilizing the Plaintiffs' Products on tribal ground but were a blanket 
blacklisting/boycotting of Plaintiffs. Generally, 548-579. 
Further, the trial court could not conceive of any relief that would not prejudice 
the Tribe. R. 1769. Clearly, limiting relief to restraining conduct that is ultra vires, occurs 
outside of Ute Tribal land, and in violation of state law as set forth in the Amended 
Complaint would prejudice no legitimate interest of the Tribe. 
In summary, the Tribe is not a necessary party as to lawsuits brought to enjoin 
ultra vires acts of tribal officials that violate state law and occur on state land outside of 
Ute Tribal land. Therefore, the Tribe is not a necessary party pursuant to Utah R. of Civ. 
P. l 9(a). 
If a party is not a necessary party, the inquiry stops and Utah R. of Civ. P. 19(6) 
need not be analyzed. However, the trial court also erroneously found that the Tribe is 
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an indispensable party under Utah R. of Civ. P. l 9(b ). "If the court finds that the party is 
necessary according to these criteria, rule 19 provides that the party shall be joined. 
Thus, under the language of the rule, if the party is necessary and joinder is feasible, then 
joinder is mandatory. Nevertheless, failure to join generally is not considered to be a 
jurisdictional defect." Landes, 795 P .2d at 1131. 
The indispensability of a party is determined by examining, "(l) to what extent a 
judgment rendered in the [party's] absence will prejudice [the party] or those already 
parties; (2) the likelihood of reducing or avoiding prejudice by protective measures or 
provisions in the judgment; (3) the adequacy of the judgment which might be entered in 
the [party's] absence; and (4) the adequacy of the plaintiffs remedy if the action is 
dismissed for nonjoinder." Mower v. Simpson, 2012 UT App 149,128,278 P.3d 1076. 
The reasons the Tribe would not suffer prejudice should a judgment be rendered 
have been addressed, supra, and will not be reiterated here. However, the trial court also 
reasoned that Newfield may be subject to, "inconsistent obligations" in State Court and 
before the Tribe. R. 1771. The trial court reasoned, "Because of the potential for 
inconsistent judgments between the state courts and the UTERO commission, Newfield is 
placed in the untenable position of operating in potential violation of inconsistent 
directives from courts of two jurisdictions." R. 1772. Newfield may have to choose 
between complying with and aiding tribal officials in unlawful and ultra vires directives 
that violate state law causing damages to state residents, or comply with state law and 
risk sanctions before the Tribe. However, as set forth in the Amended Complaint, the 
business activities at issue occur outside of Ute Tribal land and within the State of Utah. 
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Further, the directives at issue resulted in an unlawful boycott of Plaintiffs' Products 
outside of Ute Tribal land and within the State of Utah. 
Even though the situs of the acts and occurrences is outside of Ute Tribal land, the 
effect of the trial court's reasoning is that Newfield is absolutely immune from state law 
violations that occur within the state so long as Newfield is complying with a directive 
from a tribal official, even an unlawful and ultra vires directive. The state courts have a 
duty and obligation to protect state citizenry from violations of state law that occur within 
the state. The small business interests of state citizens whose business activities are 
outside of Ute Tribal land should not be subjugated foreign powers simply because the 
foreign power may penalize a party for not following an ultra vires directive that 
damages a state resident on land located within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land. 
There is no justifiable reason that a state court should defer to the Tribe as it relates 
business activities that occur within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land. 
As it relates to the adequacy of the judgment the trial court reasoned that," ... 
without injunctions against the Tribe and its UTERO officials ... " Plaintiffs would have 
an inadequate remedy. R. 1769. The injunctions that Plaintiffs requested include that the 
tribal officials be restrained from interfering with or attempting to regulate Plaintiffs' 
business activities that occur within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 577. The 
tribal officials are subject to such injunctive relief. It is true that restraining the tribal 
officials also restrains the Tribe. However, when the injunction is limited to stopping 
state law violations that occur outside of Ute Tribal land, the Tribe has no legitimate 
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interest or complaint. Likewise, a monetary damage award entered against Newfield for 
state law violations is an adequate remedy for Plaintiffs. 
As it relates to the adequacy of Plaintiffs' remedy if the action is dismissed for 
non-joinder, the trial court opined that Plaintiffs could have sought relief through Tribal 
Court or tribal administrative procedures. R. 1769-1770. The argument that 
administrative remedies must be exhausted is fundamentally flawed and the trial court 
fails to explain why Plaintiffs should subject themselves to a tribal forum when the 
business activities, acts, and occurrences complained of occurred exclusively within the 
state and outside of Ute Tribal land. In essence, the trial court determined it was 
appropriate that Plaintiffs subject themselves to tribal regulatory control to address 
business activities the situs of which is exclusively intrastate. 
In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493, 
1981 U.S. LEXIS 9, 49 U.S.L.W. 4296 (1981), a decision authored by Justice Potter 
Stewart, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the treaties between the United States and the 
Crow Tribe establishing the Tribe's Montana reservation did not give the Crow Tribe 
authority to regulate non-Indian fishing on the Big Horn River, which flows through the 
heart of the Crow Tribe's reservation. The Court conceded the retention of certain 
inherent tribal powers, but denied that these went beyond "what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations." Id. at 564-65. 
In Brenda le v. Confederated Tribes & Bandr, of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 
U.S. 408,425, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 3005, 106 L. Ed. 2d 343, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3288, 57 
U.S.L.W. 4999 (1989), the Court, applying Montana, held that, except for isolated "land-
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locked" tracts surrounded by tribal lands, tribes could not zone reservation fee land 
owned by nonmembers. A tribe's general interest in regulating reservation land use could 
not, according to the Court, support its jurisdiction under the second Montana exception. 
Id. at 428. In the instant case, tribal officials are attempting to regulate business activity 
occurring on fee land located outside of Ute Tribal land. This is well beyond a Montana 
exception. 
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997), the Montana 
rule assumed its modern form. The issue in Strate was tribal court jurisdiction over 
claims brought by tribal members against a nonmember arising from a motor vehicle 
accident on the Fort Berthold reservation. Id. at 442. First, the Court extended the 
Montana rule previously applied to tribal regulatory authority to a tribe's adjudicatory 
authority, holding that the scope of a tribe's adjudicatory authority could not exceed the 
scope of its regulatory authority. Id. at 453. Second, the Court effectively held that the 
exceptions to the general Montana rule really were not exceptions at all. Id. at 459. 
Conceding that "[ r ]ead in isolation, the Montana rule's second exception can be 
misperceived," the Court declared as the "key" to its proper application is the underlying 
principle that a tribe's authority does not extend beyond what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations. Id. 
Attempting to regulate business activity that occurs outside of Ute Tribal land has 
nothing to do with protecting tribal self-government or the ability to control internal 
relations. U.S. Supreme Court decisions make clear there is a presumption against tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers and, in the absence of congressional delegation, the burden 
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is on the Tri be to show that one of the Jvfontana exceptions applies. The business 
activities at issue take place outside of Ute Tribal land. There is no Montana exception 
that would subject Plaintiffs to the Tribe's jurisdiction and any administrative remedies 
under tribal law. Plaintiffs should not have to subject themselves to a foreign jurisdiction 
to protect business operations that are exclusively intrastate, outside of Ute Tribal land, 
and well beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribe. 
B. The trial court erred in not concluding that the state's interests in promoting 
fair and competitive business activity free from unlawful interference from foreign 
powers by protecting non-Indian state residents, who compose roughly 95% of the 
area population, state small businesses, and the oil and gas industry, which is the 
lifeblood of the local economy, outweigh the interests of the Tribe in regulating non-
Indian business activities that occur within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land. 
The recent trend of decisions from the Supreme Court requires that suits involving 
a non-Indian on privately owned land must be brought in state court. See generally Robert 
D. Probasco, Indian Tribe, Civil Rights, and Federal Courts, 7 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 
119 (2001) (explaining the jurisdictional rules applicable to Indians and non-Indians that 
depend upon land ownership). 
In Montana, supra, the Supreme Court held that tribes lack regulatory jurisdiction 
except where, "necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal 
relations". 450 U.S. at 561. The narrow exceptions, inapplicable to the case at bar, are as 
to those entering consensual relationships with the tribe or if the conduct threatens or has 
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some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or 
welfare of the tribe. In the instant case the Tribe lacks jurisdiction. The parties include 
Indians and non-Indians, the conduct occurred outside of Ute Tribal land, and no 
exception is applicable that would provide the Tribe with jurisdiction. 
However, a state may regulate activities on Indian reservations when it has a 
sufficient interest. For example, states have jurisdiction to tax the output of mines and oil 
wells of any lessee of Indian lands. See 25 U.S.C. § 398c (1927). In Hagen, supra, the 
Supreme Court found the reservation was diminished and considered the following 
factors: (1) The area is predominately populated by non-Indians; (2) A finding that the 
land remains Indian Country seriously burdens the administration of state and local 
governments; (3) The State of Utah has exercised jurisdiction over the lands open to non-
Indian settlement from the time the reservation was opened; and ( 4) That a contrary 
conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in the 
area. 510 U.S. at 420-21. 
Assuming for argument purposes this were a case of concurrent jurisdiction, the 
Court would balance the interests of protecting the vast majority of the area's population 
and the lifeblood of the local economy from the conduct set forth in the Alleged 
Complaint. Not only does the Tribe lack jurisdiction based upon the situs of the conduct 
in question, balancing the interests involved strongly favors state jurisdiction. Uintah 
Basin residents who have spent a lifetime, and in some cases generations, developing 
small business interests should not be under the constant threat of having business 
operations shut down overnight because they refuse to be extorted by a tribal official 
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acting ultra vi res and in violation of state law. Especially, where the situs is outside of 
Ute Tribal land. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
1. Overview and Legal Standard 
The alternative bases for the trial court's dismissal will be addressed in this 
section. There is considerable overlap between Defendants' respective motions and 
common legal standards of review. The general standard of review applicable is set forth 
below. Any issue with a different standard will be expressly addressed in the subsection 
as applicable. 
Fed. R. of Civ. P. 8(a)2 (2010) requires a pleading to contain a "short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoted authority and citations omitted), 
the Court instructed that Rule 8 does not require "detailed factual allegations," and then 
stated: 
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face." A claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is 
not akin to a ''probability requirement" but it asks for more than 
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 
The Court then pointed out that "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 
a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether those facts plausibly 
give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679. 
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A Utah R. of Civ. P. 12(6)(6) defense is a challenge to Plaintiffs' right to relief 
based on facts Plaintiffs have alleged. See Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264, 
1995 Utah LEXIS 43, 2 (Utah 1995). A court reviews a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
determine whether Plaintiffs would be entitled to relief under any state of facts which 
could be proved in support of its claims. See Heiner v. SJ. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 
107, 109, 1990 Utah App. LEXIS 66, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The court must accept the 
factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Alvarez 
v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987,989, 1997 Utah LEXIS 22, 5 (Utah 1997). 
2. Tortious Interference with Economic Relations 
The elements of a claim for tortious interference with economic relations include, 
"(l) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential or 
existing economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) 
causing injury to plaintiff." Leigh Furniture & Ca,pet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 
1982 Utah LEXIS 1130, 30 (Utah 1982). 
The trial comt found that the factual allegations against Newfield failed to provide 
Newfield" ... fair notice of the actions complained of." R. 1779. In addition to the 
Amended Complaint, the trial court also considered a March 20, 2013 letter from tribal 
officials. R. 1778. The relevant portions of the March 20, 2013, letter considered by the 
trial court include, "Any use of these businesses and individuals [Plaintiffs] by an 
employer doing work on the Reservation after receipt of this Notice may result in the 
assessment of penalties and/or sanctions against such employer to the fullest extent of the 
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law." R. 000053. Notably, this directive is not limited to use of the Plaintiffs on Ute 
Tribal land but is rather a blanket boycott/blacklist of Plaintiffs regardless of the situs of 
the business activity. 
As it relates to fair notice of the actions complained of the allegations of the 
Amended Complaint are that: (1) Newfield agreed to cooperate with the tribal officials 
ultra vires directive and boycott Plaintiffs; (2) Newfield refused to work with any third 
party that does business with Plaintiffs; (3) Newfield intentionally interfered with 
Plaintiffs existing and potential relations; (4) Newfield acted with an improper purpose 
and/or through improper means in aid of the tribal officials; (5) Newfield did so to 
promote its own business interests; and (6) these actions are the direct and proximate 
cause of injury to Plaintiffs. R 558-559, 567-568. Contrary to the trial court's finding, the 
facts set forth in the Amended Complaint allege that Newfield not only agreed to join in 
the boycott and blacklisting of Plaintiffs, but that Newfield threatened to boycott any 
third party who conducted business with Plaintiffs. Id. 
Moreover, Utah courts have ruled that in commercial settings a court should look 
to improper means and have said that "improper means is shown when the plaintiff 
proves that the defendant's means of interference were contrary to statutory, regulatory, 
or common law .... " U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App. 303, ,J49, 990 
P.2d 945 (quoted authority omitted). Improper means can include violence, threats and 
violating established standards of the trade or profession. St. Benedicts Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,201, 1991 Utah LEXIS 36, 22 (Utah 1991) ((quoting Top 
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Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 201, 210 n.11, 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 
n.11 (1978)). 
The Amended Complaint sets forth substantial and detailed facts concerning 
improper means in relationship to Newfield. The UTERO officials desired to regulate 
businesses outside of Ute Tribal land, and the UTERO Commissioners sought payment of 
bribes and to extort area small businesses. Generally, 548-579. The UTERO 
Commissioners, in an attempt to force Plaintiffs to pay them bribes and to comply with 
the UTERO ordinance outside of Ute Tribal land, threatened Plaintiffs that they would 
put them out of business. Id. To accomplish that illegal activity, the UTERO 
Commissioners blacklisted and boycotted Plaintiffs. Id. Newfield assisted the UTERO 
Commissioners in that illegal activity, participating in the boycott, and refusing to use 
Plaintiffs' Products and also refusing to use the services of anyone who did business with 
Plaintiffs, as requested by the UTERO Commissioners. Id. The boycott and blacklisting, 
as well as the extortionist demands, are unlawful. Id. But for Newfield's cooperation 
and aid the unlawful threats of tribal officials would be empty. Id. These activities 
constitute improper means on the part of Newfield. The elements of the tort of unlawful 
interference with prospective economic advantage have been properly pled. 
3. Extortion 
Newfield argued and the trial court agreed that Utah does not recognize a cause of 
action for extortion. R. 1779-1780. This is an issue of first impression and the trial court 
failed to support its position with any meaningful analysis. The cases cited by Newfield 
in support of its position before the trial court, however, are not dis positive on that 
Page 33 of 54 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
assertion. Jensen v. America's Wholesale Lender, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67777, 2010 
WL 2720745 (D. Utah 2010), involved prose litigants, and the court's holding consists 
of a conclusory ruling, devoid of any legal analysis. The report and recommendation in 
Whipple v. Utah, No. 2: I O-cv-81 1 DAK, 201 1 WL 4368568 (D. Utah Aug. 25, 2011) 
(unreported) does not analyze the issue, but simply asserts that there is no civil cause of 
action in Utah for theft. 
Utah has, however, allowed for civil relief in such circumstances. See e.g. Hill v. 
Estate of Allred, 2009 UT 28,216 P.3d 929; Alta Indus. LTD v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 
1290 (Utah 1993); Bonnie & Hyde Inc. v. Lynch, 2013 UT App. 153,305 P.3d 196. 
Extortion is a theft crime in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-406 (1973). In Utah, 
individuals have a right to seek recovery when they have been subjected to a theft in its 
many varieties. See e.g. Hill, 2009 UT 28; Alta Indus., 846 P.2d at 1290. 
Extortion has also been recognized as a tort cause of action in some states. In 
California, it is sometimes referred to as duress or economic duress. See Crosstalk 
Productions Inc. v. Jacobsen, 65 Cal. App. 4th 631, 645 (1998) (quoted authority 
omitted), stating that the elements are threats to business or property "sufficiently 
coercive to cause a reasonably prudent person to be faced with no reasonable alternative 
but to 'succumb'" to the threat. Utah has adopted a cause of action in contract law that 
allows the voiding of a contract for economic duress. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc v. Johnson, 
596 P.2d 658, 660 (Utah 1979). Counsel was unable to locate any decision directly 
addressing whether Utah recognizes extortion or duress as a tort. However, Utah has 
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recognized an individual's right to sue personally for losses caused by theft and there is 
no reason that right should not include extortion. 
In the instant case the demands for extortion and threats put Plaintiffs under 
extreme duress. These threats were particularly alarming to Plaintiffs who were aware of 
similarly situated businesses that were shut down by tribal officials if the businesses 
refused to be extorted. These threats cut directly to the viability of area businesses and the 
ability of area residents to earn a livelihood. 
4. Utah Antitrust Act 
The trial court found that "[t]he Plaintiffs offer no facts alleging that Newfield and 
the other Defendants had a meeting of the minds to boycott Plaintiffs' business. All that 
is alleged is UTERO informed Newfield that the Rocks Off was no longer allowed to 
conduct business on tribal land, and Newfield relayed the message to the Plaintiffs 
explaining that Newfield was not going to do business with Plaintiffs due to the UTERO 
notice. The Plaintiffs' claim merely recites the elements of an antitrust claim." R. 1780. 
The facts in the Amended Complaint directly conflict with the trial court's finding. 
The Amended Complaint is expressly clear that Plaintiffs do not conduct business on 
tribal land and Plaintiffs do not even have to pass through tribal land in conducting 
Plaintiffs' business activities. R. 554-555. The tribal officials demand was not limited to 
Ute Tribal land but a general boycott of Plaintiffs' businesses. Further, Newfield 
facilitated the boycott by demanding all third parties it does business with to boycott 
Plaintiffs in furtherance of the" ... unlawful UTERO blacklist and boycott of Plaintiffs." 
R. 559. 
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Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-3101 (2013) provides that "[t]he purpose of [the Utah 
Antitrust Act] is ... to encourage free and open competition ... by prohibiting ... unfair 
trade practices, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade .... " The statute is to 
be interpreted in light of the strong public policy disfavoring anti-competitive practices." 
Summit Water Distrib. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, ~29, 123 P.2d 437 (citing City of 
Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,398 (1978)), and the provisions of the 
statute are to be broadly construed. Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 185, 1998 Utah LEXIS 
37, 25-26 (Utah 1998). 
Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action alleges that Defendants, including Newfield, 
entered into contracts, agreements or conspiracies to place unlawful restraints on trade or 
commerce, and that they were involved in an unlawful boycott of Plaintiffs. R. 569-572. 
Newfield argued before the trial court that there is no contract, combination or 
conspiracy. "' [N]o formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy,' 
and ... 'business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact 
finder may infer agreement."' Brixen & Christopher Architects v. State, 2001 UT App 
210, 135, 29 P.3d 650 (quoted authority omitted). The conspiracy may be vertical or 
horizontal. Id. at ~1 36-39. 
The factual allegations are that the UTERO Commissioners sent a letter to 
Newfield asking it to boycott Plaintiffs and not purchase Products from Plaintiffs or from 
anyone who obtained Products from Plaintiffs. R. 558-559. The UTERO Commissioners 
further asked Newfield to purchase those Products from entities in which the UTERO 
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Commissioners owned an interest, such as Larose Construction, or from whom they were 
receiving bribes or kickbacks, such as Huffman. R. 569-572. 
The UTERO Commissioners intended to put Plaintiffs out of business through the 
unlawful boycott. R. 571. Newfield expressly agreed to that request in written 
communications sent to Plaintiffs and ceased purchasing Products from Plaintiffs. R. 
558-559. In addition, Newfield demanded that third party businesses participate on the 
boycott. R. 558-559. Such action manifests an agreement, contract, combination or 
conspiracy. 
Newfield's argument before the trial court, and the trial court's finding that the 
Amended Complaint does not allege any facts of the agreement, ignores the factual 
allegations in paragraphs 18 thru 96 of the Amended Complaint, including allegations 
that the UTERO Commissioners intended to shut down Plaintiffs' business, that, on 
March 20, 2013, Newfield was told not to utilize Plaintiffs' Products, that, on March 22, 
2013, Newfield agreed with that unlawful boycott request and informed Plaintiffs it 
would no longer utilize Plaintiffs' Products and that it would also not use any business 
that utilized Plaintiffs' Products. R. 552-562. Newfield agreed to and did cooperate with 
the tribal officials in this boycott to put Plaintiffs out of business and to enhance the 
businesses in which the tribal officials had an interest or from whom they were receiving 
bribes. R. 552-562, 568-571. Plaintiffs also alleged bid rigging. Specifically, " ... that 
UTERO officials dictate to oil and gas companies which contractors will be awarded bids 
and which contractors are not to be used." R. 561. This bid rigging is not limited to Ute 
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Tribal land and as set forth in the amended complaint the conduct complained of occurs 
outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 562. 
The present case is not unlike State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), where a security officer 
accepted monies to exclude other security guard service providers from successfully 
bidding on the Utah Power and Light contract. Here Newfield, while not taking a bribe, 
but wanting to ensure work from the Tribe, agreed to prevent Plaintiffs and others from 
receiving orders from Newfield for Products, so that those orders went to entities in 
which the UTERO Commissioners had an interest or which were bribing the UTERO 
Commissioners. 
Plaintiffs must also show that the "alleged concerted action imposes an 
unreasonable restraint on trade." The Fifth Cause of Action is based on the Utah Antitrust 
Act. Under Utah law, "[s]ome activities in restraint of trade 'have such a predictable and 
pernicious anti-competitive effect, and such limited potential for pro-competitive benefit, 
that they are deemed unlawful per se."' Brix en, 2001 UT App 210 if 41, ( quoted authority 
omitted); See also Utah Code Ann. §76-10-3112 (2013) (identifying "price fixing, bid 
rigging, agreeing among competitors to divide customers or territories, or ... engaging 
in a group boycott with specific intent of eliminating competition" as per se violations). 
Notably, in Thompson, supra, the court observed that per se violations of a group 
boycott under Utah statute could be interpreted more broadly than under federal law, 751 
P.2d at 813, stating that "[a]lthough the coercive pressure was applied vertically, the 
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stifling of competition was horizontal. A conspiracy to form a group boycott was 
therefore established." Id. at 814 (cited authority omitted). 
The actions of Newfield and the UTERO Commissioners amount to an illegal 
boycott, bid rigging and/or restraint of trade, clearly harming the local oil and gas 
industry by increasing production costs (valid market) in the Uintah Basin and the public 
that pays for that activity as it damages the local economic activity by hurting all 
businesses operating in the local oil and gas industry, which is the lifeblood of the local 
economy. The Amended Complaint alleges that Newfield and the UTERO officials 
conspired to eliminate Plaintiffs as competitors, diverted work from Plaintiffs in 
exchange for bribes from Plaintiffs' competitors, diverted work to competitors in which 
tribal officials had an interest and illegally boycotted Plaintiffs. R. 568-571. These 
allegations not only plead sufficient circumstances under the rule of reason analysis, but 
Plaintiffs have pled per se violations of state law including unlawful boycotting and bid 
rigging. R. 552-562, 568-571. 
5. Blacklisting 
In an analysis consisting of a single paragraph, the trial court found that, "The 
facts allege that Newfield followed the direction of UTERO by not using Plaintiff for 
work completed on tribal land because the Plaintiff was no longer licensed to do work on 
tribal land." R. 1781. This finding directly conflicts with the facts set forth in the 
Amended Complaint. R. 548-579. This demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the trial court in that work done on tribal land and Plaintiffs working on tribal land was 
never alleged in the Amended Complaint and is not at issue. See R. 562. Plaintiffs' 
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Amended Complaint alleges the contrary. R. 562. Specifically, that Plaintiffs' business 
operations are conducted outside of tribal land and Plaintiffs do not work on tribal land. 
R. 553-555. 
Before the trial court, Newfield asserted that Utah does not recognize a cause of 
action for blacklisting, relying on Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). In that case, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the version of Section 19, Article 
XII, of the Utah Constitution, in effect at that time, did not create a private cause of 
action, because Section 19 instructed that the legislature would provide for enforcement 
and that the legislature had provided criminal sanctions in Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-24-1 
and 34-24-2. However, the court, in rendering its decision, noted that its decision was 
premised upon the constitutional provision "in force at the time," and that "the last 
sentence [of Section 19) was stricken by constitutional amendment effective on January 
1, 1993 ." Id. at 10, n.2. Indeed, the amendment removed the language that the 
legislature would provide a remedy for a constitutional violation. Moreover, in 2013, 
Utah Code Ann.§§ 34-24-1 and 34-24-2, were themselves repealed. 
The floor debate on the issue of the repeal of§§ 34-24-1 and 34-24-1 is 
elucidating on the issue of a civil cause of action for blacklisting. Senator Daniel 
Thatcher, the bill's sponsor, contended there was no need for the criminal statute as he 
could not find a case of its being prosecuted, and that blacklisting was already covered by 
civil law, stating, among other things, that "where causing financial harm to another 
person is covered under civil law which really is a more appropriate place for this to be 
handled" and "the current practice is to handle all of this under civil law." Recording of 
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Utah Senate Floor Debates, S.B. 142, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 4, 2013). Senator John 
Valentine, speaking in favor of the bill, agreed that no criminal repercussions for 
blacklisting were needed, averring, "I have seen lots of cases brought in the civil [ court] . 
. . , where this cause of action is widely recognized, [ and] is widely proceeded upon by 
attorneys," and "there's an adequate remedy in ... civil matters to sue for damages and 
for injunctive relief.'' Id. Senator Thatcher then, in summation, emphasized, "The act of 
stopping someone who has done no wrong from getting another job is a deplorable act, it 
is a shameful act, and it is an act where the person wronged should have the opportunity 
to sue for redress of grief, which is the current practice. I am not proposing that 
blacklisting ... is appropriate." Id. In short, both senators strenuously argued the criminal 
provisions of the repealed sections were unnecessary as the baneful act of blacklisting 
could be addressed in civil court, as Plaintiffs seek to do in this matter. 
Of note, in 2012, many years after the decision cited by Newfield and even before 
the repeal of the aforesaid statutory provisions, in Brock v. Herbert, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 42041, il 7, 2012 WL 1029355 (D. Utah 2012), the court recognized the 
possibility of blacklisting claims, stating "Utah courts have given little guidance on the 
scope and applicability of these provisions, referring to Utah Const. Art. XII § 19 and 
XVI §4, in cases like the one currently before the court. Novel questions of state law 
should be decided by state courts." 
Newfield also argued before the trial court that there was no allegation of an 
exchange of blacklists, but this ignores the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint. The 
UTERO Commissioners blacklisted Plaintiffs and told Newfield not to use them or their 
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services or the services of those utilizing Plaintiffs' services, even though Plaintiffs' 
operate outside of Ute Tribal land. Newfield agreed to cooperate with the UTERO 
officials, and, in fact, did take that illegal action. Newfield also refused to do business 
with parties who were doing business with Plaintiffs. This clearly interfered with 
Plaintiffs' employment, ability to earn a livelihood, and such is a violation of Articles 
Utah Const. Art. XII § 19 and XVI §4 
6. Civil Conspiracy 
The trial com1, in an analysis consisting of a brief paragraph, found as relevant to 
this appeal, "The Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint does not allege any facts 
concerning an underlying tort. Nor have the Plaintiffs alleged any facts showing 
Newfield and the other Defendants came to a meeting of the minds to commit an 
unlawful act against Plaintiffs." R. 1782. For the reasons set forth supra, the trial court's 
finding directly conflicts with or ignores the allegations set forth in the Amended 
Complaint. 
The trial court's finding ignores the provisions of the Amended Complaint that 
contain the allegations with respect to the torts of interference with prospective economic 
advantage, extortion, blacklisting and antitrust. These allegations, as stated in the 
Amended Complaint, are incorporated into each successive claim. 
The Amended Complaint alleges that the UTERO Commissioners communicated 
with Newfield and asked for its support in the commission of these torts by refusing to 
continue to use Plaintiffs' Products. Newfield agreed with the UTERO Commissioners 
(meeting of the minds) to assist the UT.ERO Commission in committing these torts and 
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illegal activity. Newfield then complied with the request and stopped using Plaintiffs' 
Products, and Newfield also refused to use third-party service providers that utilized 
Plaintiffs' Products. 
Civil conspiracy requires (1) combination of two or more persons (in this case 
Newfield and the UTERO Commissioners), (2) object to be accomplished (put Plaintiffs 
out of business and enhance selected competitors), (3) a meeting of the minds on the 
course of action (UTERO Commissioners asked Newfield to participate in the illegal 
boycott and not buy services and products from Plaintiffs or those purchasing Products 
from Plaintiffs and Newfield agreed), ( 4) one or more unlawful acts (illegal boycott and 
restraint of trade, extortion, blacklisting) and (5) damages. See Alta Industries LTD v. 
Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, n. 17, 1993 Utah LEXIS 37,205 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah 1993) 
(listing the elements of civil conspiracy). 
7. Claims against D.Ray Enterprises and LaRose Construction 
The trial court's factual analysis of the 12(b)(6) motion made by D.Ray 
Enterprises and Larose Construction consists of two sentences. These two sentences 
read, "The Amended Verified Complaint only alleges facts regarding the individual 
Defendants' actions as individuals and as government officials of the Tribe. 
Consequently, the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
against these two corporate Defendants." R. 1785. 
The allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint relevant to these corporate 
defendants are as follows. That LaRose, as on owner of Larose Construction, receives 
bribes and work from Huffman, a competitor of Plaintiffs, in exchange for LaRose 
Page 43 of 54 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
abusing his position as a tribal officer and wrongfully diverting business from Plaintiffs 
to Huffman. R. 561. Further, that LaRose, L.C. Welding, and Scamp conspired to receive 
an economic interest in a competing gravel pit located on " ... private fee land which 
commenced operations immediately after Plaintiffs operations were shut down by 
Director Wopsock." R. 571. Cesspooch owns an interest in an oil & gas service company 
D.Ray Enterprises. R. 562. Cesspooch, LaRose, and Director Wopsock conspired to 
abuse their UTERO positions to eliminate Plaintiffs as a competitor. R. 571. In addition, 
these tribal officials conspired to abuse their positions to destroy Plaintiffs' businesses for 
refusing to be extorted by Cesspooch. R. 571. That LaRose Construction and D.Ray 
Enterprises " ... participate in the conspiracy and derived a substantial economic benefit 
from the Conspiring Defendants' unlawful restraint of trade and commerce." R. 571. 
Plaintiffs also alleged that the trial court," ... has jurisdiction over the tribal 
officials based on the tribal officials' violation of state law, the acts complained of by the 
tribal officials are ultra vires, and the unlawful and unauthorized conduct has caused and 
continues to cause substantial and irreparable harm to non-Indian Plaintiffs business 
activities on private fee land that is not Indian Country or reservation ... " R. 562. 
It is difficult to understand why the trial court failed to consider these factual 
allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint in dismissing the action as it relates to 
LaRose Construction and D.Ray Enterprises. Plaintiffs expressly and clearly alleged that 
these companies engaged in the conspiracy for the express purpose of eliminating 
Plaintiffs as a competitor and because Plaintiffs refused to be extorted. Further, the 
location of this wrongful conduct was outside of Ute Tribal land. 
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D. The trial court erred in concluding that the tribal officials are immune from 
suit when the conduct complained of violates state law, occurred outside of Ute 
Tribal land, within the State of Utah and outside the jurisdiction of the Tribe. 
In dismissing the action against the tribal officials the trial court found that, "The 
Plaintiffs allege that the UTERO officials acted beyond the scope of the authority given 
them to regulate business on tribal land." R. 1787. Plaintiffs alleged nothing of the sort in 
the Amended Complaint. In fact, Plaintiffs allege exactly the opposite. 
What Plaintiffs allege in the Amended Complaint is that, "This Court has 
jurisdiction over the tribal officials based on the tribal officials violations of state law, the 
acts complained of by the tribal officials are ultra vires, and the unlawful and 
unauthorized conduct has caused and continues to cause substantial and irreparable harm 
to non-Indian Plaintiffs' business activities on private fee land that is not Indian Country 
or reservation as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114 
S. Ct. 958 (1994)." R. 562. This allegation and theme is repeated throughout the 
Amended Complaint. Generally, 548-579. Therefore, the trial court's statements that the 
situs of the acts at issue is Ute Tribal land directly diverges from the facts alleged 
throughout the Amended Complaint. Id. Further, the tribal officials are sued in their 
individual as well as their official capacities. Accordingly, the trial court's analysis 
misses the mark. 
The trial court found that the Tribe was the "real party in interest" in dismissing 
this action as to the tribal officials. R. 1787. However, precedent makes clear that tribal 
officers are liable for damages for ultra vires acts. In Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n, 498 U.S. 
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at 514, the Court stated, "we have never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe 
are not liable for damage in actions brought by the State." This statement was made even 
though the Court recognized that there was" ... no doubt that sovereign immunity ... " 
barred the" ... most efficient remedy .... " which would have been a suit against the 
tribe. Id. 
As explained by the D.C. Circuit, "There may be, of course, suits for specific 
relief against officers of the sovereign which are not suits against the sovereign .... 
[W]here the officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations 
are considered individual and not sovereign actions ... " Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 
741, 750, 383 U.S. App. D.C. 14, 23, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16561 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Co,p., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1949)). 
As alleged in the instant case, the actions of the tribal officials are not only beyond the 
scope of the OTERO ordinance but also beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribe 
itself which infringes upon the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. R. 562. 
The Ninth Circuit has held that tribal officials enjoy immunity only to the extent 
of the tribe's valid authority. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of 
Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 924 F.2d 899,902 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 
1212 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Big Horn County Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Adams, 
219 F .3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000). In the instant case Tribe officials are engaged in wrongful 
conduct outside of Ute Tribal land that damages non-Indian state residents and small 
businesses. This is beyond the Tribe's jurisdiction and "valid authority" making 
Burlington on point. The holding that tribal officials lack immunity for conduct beyond 
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the jurisdiction of the tribe has been followed by many circuits. See Baker Electric Co-
op, Inc. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1471-72 (8th Cir. l 994t see also Wisconsin v. Baker, 
698 F.2d 1323, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); see also 
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16, 30 (1st Cir. 2006 (en bane, 
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1053 (2006). 
In all of these cases, it could be argued that the tribe is the real party in interest. 
However, when the allegation is that tribal officials have acted beyond the scope of the 
authority the tribe is capable of bestowing, such as in the instant case, there is no 
immunity for the tribal officials. The trial court's dismissal on the grounds that the Tribe 
is the real party in interest runs afoul of well-reasoned precedent of the circuit courts. 
E. The Tribe Waived Sovereign Immunity 
On August 2, 2013, the parties submitted briefing to the trial court on the issue of 
whether the Tribe made a general appearance in this action. A determination of that issue 
was not made by the trial court at the time of the January 29, 2016 hearing on the 
motions to dismiss at issue in the instant appeal. On January 29, 2016, Plaintiffs provided 
the Court and opposing counsel with cases holding that sovereign immunity is waived if 
an Indian Tribe makes a general appearance in a state court action. This issue is an issue 
of first impression and a question of law. 
In Friends of East Willits Valley v. Cnty of Mendocino, 101 Cal. App. 4th 191, 
197, 202, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 708, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 4509, 2002 Cal. Daily Op. 
Service 7488, 2002 Daily Journal DAR 9380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2002), the court 
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cited with approval a prior unpublished opinion that concluded that because an Indian 
Tribe made a general appearance in a state court action it waived its sovereign immunity. 
In United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1015, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 17888 
(9th Cir. 1981 ), the court held that a tribe, by intervening in a lawsuit, assumed the risk 
that its position would not be accepted and thereby waived sovereign immunity in the 
proceeding. The court reasoned, "Here, the Tribe intervened to establish and protect its 
treaty fishing rights; a basic assumption of that action was that there would be fish to 
protect. Had the original decree found the species to be in jeopardy, and enjoined all 
parties from future fishing in order to conserve the species, the Yakimas could not have 
then claimed immunity from such an action. Otherwise, tribal immunity might be 
transformed into a rule that tribes may never lose a lawsuit." Id. at 1014. 
A California trial court cited the above decisions when it found that a Tribe 
waived sovereign immunity when it appeared before the court and sought affirmative 
relief. See Nushake, Inc. v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, CGC-05-441299. 
The general principle of the cases cited, supra, is that if a tribe seeks affirmative 
relief from a state court, or federal court, the tribe has waived sovereign immunity. This 
principle is consistent with Barlow v. Cappo, 821 P.2d 465,467 (Utah App. 1991), 
holding that when a defendant seeks affirmative relief from a Court, the defendant has 
submitted himself to that court's jurisdiction. 
In the instant case, the Tribe has sought affirmative relief from the trial court that 
necessarily entails a concession that this Court has jurisdiction over this action. For 
example, the Tribe argued before the trial court that not only should the case be dismissed 
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because the Tribe has sovereign immunity, but the Court should dismiss the action as to 
the remaining defendants because the Tribe is a necessary and indispensable party. 
Consequently, the Tribe has gone beyond seeking dismissal based on sovereign immunity 
grounds, it has sought affirmative relief on behalf of other defendants, in addition to the 
Tribe, and moved for a dismissal of the action as to these defendants as well. 
The Tribe has also requested that this Court interpret certain provisions of the 
UTERO Ordinance and tribal law in consideration of the issues of waiver of sovereign 
immunity and dismissal on the grounds of exhaustion of administrative remedies. To 
dismiss on these grounds, the Court must have jurisdiction. By moving to dismiss on 
these grounds, the Tribe has waived immunity and conceded jurisdiction by requesting 
relief that necessitates that the trial court exercise jurisdiction. The Tribe could have 
limited its motion to dismissing the action as to the Tribe on the grounds of sovereign 
immunity. However, the Tribe, on multiple occasions, has sought affirmative relief from 
the state court on grounds that concede jurisdiction. Plaintiffs seek leave to submit 
briefing on this issue. 
F. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement 
Utah R. of Civ. P. 15(d) provides: 
( d) Supplemental pleadings. -- Upon motion of a party the 
court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as 
are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting 
forth transactions or occurrences or events which have 
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be 
supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the 
original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for 
relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that the 
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adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so 
order, specifying the time therefor. 
"The corni's standard for exercising discretion on a motion to supplement is the 
same as that for disposing of a motion to amend under Rule 15(a)[2]." First Savings 
Bank v. U.S. Bancorp, 184 F.R.D. 363,368 (D. Kan. 1998) (quoted authority and 
citations omitted). In considering motions to amend pleadings, primary considerations 
are whether parties have adequate notice to meet new issues and whether any party 
receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
786 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoted authority and citations omitted). 
Rule lS(d) provides that "[o]n motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on 
just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, 
occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15( d). A Rule 15( d) motion is "addressed to the sound discretion of the 
court, and leave to serve a supplemental pleading 'should be liberally granted unless good 
reason exists for denying leave.'" Sw. Nurseries, LLC v. Florists Mut. Ins., Inc., 266 F. 
Supp. 2d 1253, 1256 (D. Colo. 2003) (quoting Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 240 
F.3d 1268, 1278 (10th Cir. 2001 )). "Refusing leave to amend is generally only justified 
upon a showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or 
dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or 
futility of amendment." Frankv. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir. 1993). 
Despite the passage of time, this case is in its infancy and allowing leave to supplement 
will not prejudice any party. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court reverse the 
trial court's decision in its entirety and remand the case back to trial court. 
DATED this 28th day of September, 2016. 
JOHN D. HANCOCK LAW GROUP, PLLC 
Isl John D. Hancock 
John D. Hancock, Esq. (#10435) 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose 
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party 
in the action if ( 1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the 
action in his absence may (i} as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the 
court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be 
made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his 
joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person as described in Subdivision 
(a)(1 )-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good 
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent 
person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to 
what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already 
parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the 
person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action 
is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if 
known to the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision (a}( 1 )-(2} hereof who are not joined, 
and the reasons why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23. 
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;~:..: 
Brotherso11. 
The portion of this motion seeking dismissal on the, grouil,ds th.at the Tdbe is an 
indispensable partyisjoiried by-all ofth.e defendants, 
The Court :heard oral argument orF this ,Motion and on the motions· of· the other 
Defendants 01i:Jaii~aty 29, 2016~ Oral argu:1nentwas provided ftoin ,at.I of the.J>a1ties on Gach of 
the Motions. The:issues were taken under advisement. After careful review of' the pleadings, the · 
~gmnents:i and the relevant case law~ the Cou~: is prepared tt:>nile on the iss1Jcs. 
n 
The Defendants move. the Court to dismiss th~ Plai.11tiff:Sf Verified Co.mplaint. pursu.anttc> 
Rule t;2{b)(l) an.i12(b)(7) of the. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, The Defendants argue this 
+ . . 
Court lacks sµbje¢tin.atter jtif.i.sdictiori because the Tribe enjoys· sove1\eigq • imrn unity. 
,.~ ~ 
Additionally~ the Defendants argue thatthe Verified Complaint'should b,;.-dismissed as to an 
Defendants because·-i~e Tribe i~ a necessary and i:n.di.spensable:party .pursuant-to Rule l9. 
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
1~ 
( 
Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional issue. Ramey Constr. Ca.., Inc~ v. The Apache 
Tribe of the Me.<;c~lero Reservation; 673 F.2d 315; 3 l8 (10th Cir. 1982). An Indian tribe is· 
; 
· immune from sui-iimless the tribe has \.vaived its immunity orCQngress authorized-the snit 
Kiow(i Tribe of Okldhoma v. 1\lanujacturing· technoiogies-, Inc,,~-- 52JtJ;S. 751, 754 {198:8). In. 
order to wa.ivetd&al sovereign:immuiiity.Co:ngress mustun¢quivofa1Iy·exptessits intent to do 
:so, or the tribe mt.i~tdeaily waive immunity. C&L Enterprises., Inc. y, :Citizen Band Po,tawato,ni 
·f. . . .. . . .··: : 
l11:dian:Tribeo/O~lal{o11t~1, 532 U.S. 411,418 (2001);.seealso.SantaClai~a:v .. Pueblo v. 
/.: 
Martinez~4$(i 1J.S\ 49) 58 (1978). "A~sent an effective waiver or consent,.itis settled t.llat a state, 
''! 
~;-: 
,_,L_ ... •·: . . :· . .. . .. . , . , .·· ... ·. . .. 
c.ourt may not exercise. jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe;'~ Puyallup Tribe, 1nc; v . 
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DepartmentofG:dine of State ofWash., 433 lJ.S; 165~ 172 (1977). 
ThetJte fudian. Ttibe~sLaw and Ord.er Code des¢ribeI$ the extent of.thcTi-il;Je's.s.tJ:Vereign 
irru11unity and:the:bircurnstanc<}S in.which the.tribe's sovcreignimmurfrty.tnay be waive~~ 
Except8$ £1¢qµited by federal law, pflhe Constitution and Bylaws pf the Ut~ In.dian 
Tribe; or ~ts· specifically wah1ed by a re.soluti.on or ordinance ot the Bush1ess 
Committee specifica1lyreferri11g to such, the Ute Indian:Tribe shall ·be imnwn~ from 
sllitjn atitcivil action; atidits ofticef$Jtnd empJqyees immune froin suitfo.r any 
liabilitf arising .from the performance 9ftheir official duties~ 
UL.O.C § l~s .. s. :' 1:he UTERO Ordinf}11ce. does waive sovereign imn.1miityJn certain 
· circum.stances. s~htion 13 3,. of the UTERO Ordinance states: 
The Tribe l1ere.by agree.s tp waive its sovereign inunµnity for th¢. sole •. an¢t fa)ri~cl 
purposeof.t~®)fCt!Ill~nt of: t~~ terms of thisOrdiiumce. This waiver is expressly 
limited to jJljµnctive and declaratory relief ·with respect to the enforcement of the 
•- (.,,. :•.:. ; •- ' . . . - . . --:. __ . 
ten11s pfthlsQrdinance aµd does not inc}udemonetruy4amag~s.: This limited ,vai ver 
is not, 2.114.should not be construed as ft blanket -w~_iVet of the Tribe,s sovereign 
immunity,? Under no circumstances'shall the tribal· funds of the Tribal Treasury be 
subject to a11yaward for da.mages·, 
UTERO Ord~~ Sec~ 13.3. The vvaiver is Hrrfrted to enforc.ement of the UTERO Ordinance only, 
. ' ' . ' 
:;, 
and is ,not a hlartk;~ waiver, or wajver for any oth~r p1upo$e. Ute Tenth Cil:cuit Court of'Appeals 
recentlyinterpret1 f this section of'the UTf:RO Ordinance and held: 
i 
Under the:?terr11,s of that ordi11ance~ tlJe Txibe has irtdee.d 'agreq[d] to M'aive its 
sover~ign #nrtturuty/ But the ordinance explains that this iwavier is not, ~nd should 
tl.Ot be construed11,s·a blan,k~t,,vaiverofthe Trib~'s.spyereign immunity.' lnstea4=,>the. 
waiver cx\$ts tfo.rJhe.sole andihnited purpose ofenforceme.nt of the ten:ns of[the] 
Ordinance· ••• ~- , ' 
Ute lndian Tribe.Jfthe1./intahimtl Ow·ayReservation v. lfiate of Utah~ 790 F.3d 1000,,tOJO 
~:~ 
(1Qth.:Cir. 20l5)(q~ntingtJTERQ Ordinanc¢). TheColll'.t fµrthe.r e?(plained: . 
.. 
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ld~ 
be d.escrib~d. .as ruteffort to 'enforcet the ordinance~ itself a seriously questionable.. 
notion -w the 9r,dh1ance is en!or~~able prilj,r. before tdbal court~ t1nd the Tribe~s 
{Jl:ERQ Com.mi$~igµ. N?-i¥.h¢.t'e does the \Va.tv~r p;nnit ot.herj,arties to hakdh~ 
Ttj~e ~efore a 1101ittiha1 tribunal and this cowt enjoys 'no autlitsrity to rewrite for the 
defendimts·:the:waiverthe•:tr.ibe, has writtenfotit~eff. 
The :Plai.p1iffs arguetheTrib.e has waived sovereigriim,munity=by the UTEROCode 
Section 13.3. Co11~eqµently> the Plaintiff argues -ihat a SP:iiagainsttlie Tribe-can be .maintain~,L 
'•t· . - ' . 
The Plaintiffs.furlper argue thatt:h~hasis for their V e.rified Complf;lirit;Js, the aHegatimithat ttie: 
'i . . . ••. . 
Defendants have ~~ted outside the scope ofUTERO and attemptedto c<mduct ille.gal:and 
nola,,141 activities outside oflhe 150,undaries ofthe Reservation. The Plaintiffs argue the 
:, 
))efendru1ts acted \Htra1 vires ancf th"ir claims do.not implicate the UTEROcride but are 
i·t 
actionable state to~,. statutory~ and constitutional claims. The Plainti:ffi; argue.thatthey are,not 
bound to prose<.,ut~: their claims in. tribal court or the before the U'TERO Co1m11.issio.1i. 
Whether t~~ Pla.mtiffis attempting to enforce terms of the UTERO Ordinance or not, the 
. . t . : . . . . . . '' . 
tesult:is the satti.e:··ai.s.nxi.ssa.J.:aga:hi~tthe Tribe for la.ck of stibject matter,jurisdiction, Jfthe 
Plaintiffs; daims t~~1it1stthe:T1:i~Je..arentftbrought pursuant td the UTERO ()i'dirta11cej·th.en 
.. 
sovereign imnnmi~ applies barring the clahns because there has been no. dear-and express 
waiver.9f soverei~r i.rn,;nunity outside of the tert.ns of the UTI3R0 Ordinan¢e. If Plaintiffs' 
~· : 
daims are, broughf to enforc.ethe LJTERO Ordinan,ce, thos¢ cfaims must.have been br:qughtin 
·; ~ 
i. 
tdba.i qcJµrt. The iatver of sovereign immunity in'the lJTERO Or-dimm~e· exp1~ln$ it is-~'f.or th..e 
' 
~Ole ,ari,d lin1ite:Q p~ttposc of erifcfrcetnentQf1he terms of [the] ()nltnmtce}' t1TEFZ9 (.);td.;. Sec~ 
' 
··1 
13.3 ~ · the waiver \~is not). and ~hould not be ~ons.trued as a blahketw~iv~i' of the .Tf,ibe's 
~;·~ 
sovereign :irnitlun1b1." Id~ However~ as explained by the Tenth <tirouit;:=according:to the :UTERO 
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Ordinance~ the claims can only be brought before the tribal court and the Tribe's UTERO 
Commission. lJn~er either scenario, this Court lacks subject matterjurisdiction over the Tribe. 
Additionaily; the Plairttif:ts argue the Tribe waived sovereig.n frnm:unity by making a 
general appearance in this litigation. Plaintitli;' memorandum .tontainecl J.lO authority for th.is 
position but referenced the argument contained in a memorandum filed by them on May 15, 
2013. That memorandum also appears devoid of any legal authority for the proposition that a 
tribe waives sovereign immunity by making a general appearance in a case. At oral argument, 
I 
Plaintiffs counsel 'iu-gued that the tribe had made a general appearance in this case by seeking a 
dismissal of the entire case forfa.ilure to join an indispensable party. Counsel then provided the 
Court with three c:ases that allegedly support the position. Those cases had not been cited d1,.1ring 
'" briefing and were ·9bjected to by defense counsel. The Court allowed the cases irt an effort to 
include all applic~ble legal authority to assist it in deciding a cornplic~ted case. The Court 
authorized defens~ ct1unsel to file a supplemental response to the three cases provided hy 
~ 
Plaintiffs. Defend~ts submitted the supplemental response as allowed by the Cowt on February 
5,2016. 
On February 8, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that the Court grant leave to 
r' 
allow full briefing._.ofthe issue of whether the Tribe's sovereign inununity was wived bymaking 
~l . . 
a general appearaqce;< Iris a rnystery to this Court why Plaintiffs believe they should be allowed 
"i! 
more argument oJ;this point. The Tribe asked for dismissal of the c~se ohthe grounds of 
sovereign immuni\y in its motion. The Plaintiffs filed a twenty-page memorandum in response 
that included an argument that the Tribe had made a general appearance in this ca:se and that it 
*J 
i' 
had waived sover~ign immunity. Then1 at oral argument Plaintiffa arguedthat same point and 
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the Court allowed-Plaintiffs to present c.ase law that they had not been provided in briefing. 
Obviously, Plaintiffs knew waiver of sovereign immunity in any of its iterations was at issue or 
they would not have appeared at oral argumen1s armed with case law onthat point. The fact.that 
,,, 
Plaintiffs failed to fully- brieffueir defenses to the primary issue raised by the Tribe in its 1tiotion 
for dismissal is inexplicable. There is no confusion on this point. The Tribe claims it is immune 
from suit in state court. The defense to this claim is waiver of immunity. Waiver potentially 
occuts in a numb~t of ways.: Any ofthe potentiaJ ways by which'Plai_ntirf claims the Tribe 
·r 
,vaivcd its immunfty mustbe raised by Plaintiff. Procedurally~ arguments are not made bya 
::. 
series of separate µiemoranda. Rather, all of a responding pruty' s arguments on a point are 
e:xpected to be made in~ single responsive pleading. There is only one reason why any further 
,. 
briefing was allo,~~dby.the Court foHowing oral argument. Namely, that P'Jaintiffs attempted to 
introduce case la~,: during oral argument that had not previously been briefed. It ·was only 
appropriate that D~fendants be given the opportunity to address case la\.v not previously disclosed 
1' 
_., 
before the Court 1Jade its ruling. That necessary briefing opens no new-doors to Plaintiffs. 
Neverthellss1 the Cotnt has reviewed the cases belatedly cited by the Plaintiffs for the 
proposition that a ~ribe waives sovereign immunity by making a general appearance in a case and 
a discussion of eat~ ishaq below. The Court first notes that subject matter jurisdiction can be 
raised at any time\Barnardv. Wasserman> 855 P.2q243> 247.;48 (Utah 1993)("This courtbas 
' ..... 
made clear that chtnenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time· and cannot be 
:-; 
waived by the parties.''). 
In Friends- of East "lf7llits Valley v. County of 1\rfendocino, 123 C!aL Rptr. 2d 708 1 711 
(Cal. Ct. App. 200_2), under fue heading of H[b]~ckground" the court stat~d: 
,, 
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In a prior wipublished decision we rejected in:itiaJ c.hallenges to trial courtjurisdiction 
over the Tribe, concluding that because the Tribe has made a general appearance, it 
waived its sovereign immunity. 
Additionally, in th~ ''[d]iscussion'} section of the ruling, the court stated: 
Indeed, the Tribe \vaived sovereign immunity previously when it made a general 
appearance in this case. It also expressly waived sovereign immw1ity in 
connection with enforcement of the Tribal/County Agreement. 
Id at 715. Notably, the statement by the Court t,hat the Tribe had waived its sove1·eign 
immunity by makH1g a general appearance in the case cites no legal authority for that 
i! 
position. Thus, whhout fmther explanation, that statement c.arries no ,.veight. The 
' 
California CourC s\iecision is not c.ontrolling and because it contoJns llO discussion and 
cites no authority,;_it cannot be persuasive. It is conceivable that the Tribe expressly 
waived immunity b its pleadings when. it appeared in the case, or perhtipsi it sought some 
affinnative relief. ) However, because the prior case is unpublished and because the 
h 
published case oft~rs no authority nor explanation fur the assertion, the case is of no 
-f 
assistance to this Court~s determination of the issue. Further, the Tribe in Friends of East 
Willits Valley exp:~essly waived its sovereign inununity ,~.:hen it entered into aspedfic 
tribal/county agreernent that was at issue in the lawsuit. Thus~ in the face of an express 
waiver contained in the \\'Titten agreement, it is difficult to determine how much 
,; 
c<)nsideration was"_given to the issue ofvv·aiver by general appearance or whether the two 
! ~~ 
:.q_, 
·were one in the san'ie in that instance. 
Next, the ~:laintiffs cite Nushake! Inc. v, State Comp. Ins. Fund, No. CGC-05-
441299, 2011 ca{Super, LEXIS 319, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 29: 2011). Jr1 Nushake, 
" 
the c.ourt held that· the tribe waived. sovereign immunity by diti;!ctly and unequivocally 
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consenting to enforcement of thc·settlement agreement in California State Court.. Id. at 
**J.5..;40. Nushak¢ 's holding, therefore, is unhelpful in this case because the Ute Tribe 
has not similarly cpnsented to enforcement of any agreement here at issue in Utah State 
Court 
Finally, the Plaintiffs cite United States v. Oregon, 657 F .2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1981 ). 
In Oregon, the Yakima Tribe moved to intervene in a lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(a)(2j. The Oregon Court held thtlt because the tribe had intervened in. the 
case it had ac;sumed the status of an original party and was fully bound by all future court 
orders. See, id a/1014. The holding in Oregon is logical because one who intervenes in 
a. case is seeking to. pursue a claim or to defend a particular position voluntarily. An 
intervenor is iden#cal to an original plaintiff Plaintiffs and infotvenors arcdn any 
particular case because they consent to be in the case. Whether a plaintiff or intervenor, 
they affinnatively ~ought to be a party. \Vere the Ute Tribe to bring an action in state 
,, 
court as a pfaintiff, or were it to intervene~ an argu:ment that it had waived immunity 
... 
could easily be made. The Ute Tribe in the present case did not voluntarily intervene, 
rather, it is an inv~luntary defendant in the action. Thus, the holding in Oregon has no 
bearing on this co·urt's dedsi.on. 
The Ute T~ibe has only sought to. have this case dismissed against it b.ased on its 
spvetcign immuni~. Additionally the Tribe has asked the case not go forward against 
;_, 
any defendant because the Tribe claims to be a1iecessary and indispensable party. The 
facts of this cased~ not parallel any of the cases-the Plaintiffs have cited in: support of 
. ' 
th~ir argument tha! soveteigi1 immunity can be waived by a general appearance. Nor do 
' j• 
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the cases cited by the :Plaintiffs suppmt the conclusion that a general appearance waives 
the sovereign immµnity of a tribe. 
TI. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. 
Next, the Defendants argue in the alternative, that the Plaintifl:S.~ Verified 
Complaint should'be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The 
t 
UTERO Ord.inande r~quires the Plaintiffs to file a written com.plaint with the UTERO 
Commission prior~:to filing sui.t. The Defendants argue the Plaintiffs failed to do this 
prior to filing the Verified Complaint 
The Court will not decide this issue. Th.e Court has already granted the Tribe's 
~) 
Motion to Dismiss,making this issue moot Because this Court does not have 
jurisdiction over the Tribe; whether or not the Plaintiff adhered to the re-quirements of the 
UTERO Ordinance in bringing their claims is of 110 consequence to this Court. This 
i 
Cou.rt would not have jurisdiction over the Tribe even if the Plaintiffs had exhausted their 
·). .... 
i. 
administrative ren~~dies. Additionally, the tribal court, if necessary, is better situated to 
\ 
determine if the P)~intiffa followed their procedures under the UTERO Ordinance. 
III. Necessary and Indispensable Party. 
Finally, th~ Defendants argue the entire- Verified. Com.plaint must be dismissed as 
t() all defendants pursua.rit to Rule l 2(b )(7) because the Tribe is immu:rte .from suit and is a 
t ~-
necessary and indEspensable party under Rule 19. 
Determinitigjoinder of a party under rule 19 requires the courtto potentially make 
a three step analy~is. Fir$t, the court must detennine whether a party is necessary. Grand 
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County v. Rogers, 44 P.Jd 734~ 740 (Utah 2002). Next, the court must detem1ine that 
joinder of the necess::.iry party is feasible. Id. at 741. Finally, if the party is necessary and 
jo~nqer is 11ot feasible, the courtmustdetermine whether the party is indispensable. Id. 
Rule 19(a)'. of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in part that a party is 
necessary if: 
(1) in his absen~ cp01plete relief cannot be. accorded among those already parties, 
or (2) he claims a..n,:fnterestrelatingto :the, subject of the action and is so situated that 
the dispositioi°f1)ftpe. action in his absence niay (i) as a practical rnatter impair or 
impede hi~ ability to P. r.·. otect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already 
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsisteW obligations by reason of his claimed interested. 
~'The basic purpose of rule 19 is 'to protect the interests of absent persons as well as those 
alreaqy before the·court from multiple litigaticm or inconsistent judic'ial determinations."' 
Landes v, City Capital Bank3 795 P 2d I 127) l: 130 (Utah 1990); quoting 7 Charles A . 
.. 
Wright, Arthur R.;:Mmer & Mary K. Kane: Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d 
§1602, at21 (1986). 
The Plaintfffs generally allege the Ute Tdb(; and the Tribe:s govc.munental 
representatives ha;e acted beyond the authority of the UTE.RO Ordinance and have 
committed torts against the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs insist that their claims do not rely on 
;i: 
the UTERO Ordirl.hnce butare simple state tort, statutory, and c.onstitutional law claims. 
The Plaintiffs claifo the individual tribal representatives acted in their official capacities~ 
although ultra vir~_s, to commit wrongful acts against the Plaintifts. Paragraphs 11, 12, 
13, and 14 of Piah{tiff•i prayer for relief in the Amended Verified Complaint requests that 
the Court enjoin tlie Ute Tribe and UTERO officials from actions that interfere \\1th 
,. 
l)laint1.ff.~'.abilities':to conduct: business. Paragraph 11 asks the Conritq enjoin the Tribe 
C 
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andUTERO officiais from regulating Plaintiffs' business activities in a manner that 
exceeds tribal autl~ority. Paragraph 12 asks for a:ri injunction against wrongful 
interference with Plaintiffs·' relationships with oil and gas companies. In. part, paragraph 
13 seeks to enjoin:retalia.tion against Plairttifrs. And paragraph 14 seeks to enjoin 
retaliation againsf oil and gas companies that do business with Plaintiffs. 
The Court must first detennine whether the Tribe is a necessary party within the 
i~ 
meaning ofU.R.C:P~ 19. The inquiry is whether the Tribe claims an interest relating to 
'1 
the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in its absence 
may as a practical-matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest. 
Any subs~tive analysis of the Plaintiffs' tort claims against UTERO otlicials 
Would require the:Court tomake specific determinations regarding the ability of' the Tribe 
to regulate tribal ~:usiness relationships. For example. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
i•: 
alleges that UTER.b officials told Defendant Newfield that if Ne1A-field utilized Plaintiffs' 
products or services, Nev.field would be perialized and/or sanctioned to the fullest extent 
oftribal law. Plaintiffs characterize the Tribe's action in sending the cornm.unication as 
-1= 
threatening, intim1cfating~ retaliating, wrongful, etc. In order for the Court enjoin UTERO 
,, 
' ( 
offidals, and thereby enjoin the 'fribe, from '\vrongfully interfering in Plaintiffs' 
" 
relationship with 9-:n and gas companies/' the. Court would nooessarily be required to 
detetmine whether the Tribe and its officials have ~uthority to give such a directive to 
Newfield and/or to other oil and gas companies, In essence, the question is whether the 
' Tribe, through its 9fficials1 may tell a company that the company may be _precluded from 
:.,•; 
operating on tribal)andsifthat company continues to engage in business wifu a particular 
f\ 
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individual or company. It seems apparent that a determination about whether the Tribe 
and its officials m~y issue directives Jelating to oil companies' business activities, such as 
the·directi.ve alleg#d to have been issued in this case, is a critical iuterestof:the Tribe; 
Further, injunctions against UTERO officials prohibiting them from issuing such 
directives eff ectiv~ly serves as an injunction against th.e Tribe from issuing those 
directives. The Court finds that such a disposition in this case, in the Tribe's absence, 
;·! 
may a.s aJlractical)nattcr:im.pair or impede the Tribe, s ability to protect that interest. 
n 
Therefore, the Tribe is a nec.essary party to this action. 
However, ~ outlined above, this Court lacks subject mutter jurisdiction over the 
Tribe, makingjoinder not fe.asible, Therefore, Rule 19(b) applies, and the Cow:t must 
f· 
detennine \Vhethe(theTribeis indispensable. Rule 19(b) states: 
i, 
If a person· described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the 
court shall~ detenhine whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed an1ong the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being 
thus regar~ed as :in.,dispeusable. The factors to be considered by the court include: 
first, to wh1;1t extent ajttdgtnent rendered iu the person: s absence might be prejudicial 
to him or those already parties; second, the .extentto ·which) by prptective provisinn.s 
in the judgment, by tlle.<shaping of relief~ or other measure, the preJudice can be 
lessened o~ avoid~d; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person1 s absence ,1vill 
be adequat~; fourth, whether the p1aintiff,;\rill have an adequate remedy if the action 
is dismiss1d for nonjoinder. 
In determiping whether a judgment rendered in the Tribe,s absen.ce might be 
prajudi~ia.l to the!-ribe,.the discussion above dearly itnplicatesa probEtl,ilityofprejudice 
;,i-: 




sending letters to pil and gas companies telling the companies that they face sanctions 
under the UTERC\Ordimmce if they coniinue to utilize.Plaintiffs' products and services. 
A determination b;· th~ Courtthat the 1.JTERO oflicials' ad of sending the directive to 
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Ne\vfield \:vas wro~igful is potentially prejudicial to the Tribe. .An injunction against tribal 
; 
offic.ials is effectively an i.PJunction against the Tribe. Such an injunction might limit the 
Tribe's ability to i
1
ssue directives h deems necessary under tlle UTERO Ordh1a.nce and 
could be prejudicial to the Tribe's ability to regulate its affairs, Potentially, depending 
upon the Tribe1 s i~1terpretations of its own laws, the Tribe could ban any person or 
company from doing business on Tribal ground for any reason. A judgment rendered by 
this C()tnt in the Thbt's absence th<1tpu.ivortsto limit the Tribe's 8:bilify to sanction o,r 
exclude businesse~~ from Tribal property for the reasons stated in the alleged 
.. 
communication in.this case creates a significant potential for prejudice against a key 
,. 
interest in tribal s~If~governance. 
Next, none of the parties have suggested howthe Court could shape the relief or 
H 
enter protective provisions in the judgment that would lessen or avoid the prejudice 
,. 
described above. Neither can the Court conceive of any. Nearly all of the Plaintiffs' 
requests for relie(~k for injunctions against the Tribe and UTERO officials. 
Conceptually: the Court cannot see how it could trrant any version of the re-liefrequestcd 
,. 
\ 
that would not prejudice the Tribe. 
, 
Further, tlie Tribe and the UTERO officials are the key figures in this action. It is 
·t 
their alleged actio~s that constitute Plaintiffs' prim.ary contention ohv.rongdoing. A 
. ( 
~. 
judgment. against the other Defendantsi vfi.thout the injunctions against the Tribe and its 
' :·: 
UTERO officials as demanded by Plaintifts would seem to be an inadequate remedy. 
1 
Finally, th~ Plaintiffs have another for~'Tl to address their claims other tha11 in the 
State Court. Plaintiffs could have ·raised their daims through tribal administrative 
Page 13 of 17 
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procedures and perhaps in the Tribal Court. The Plaintiffs argue that the Tribal Court is 
not .neutral or fair.:_-The Court sees such an allegation, without any factual basis~ no 
differently than if,Plaintiffs claimed the State's district or justice courts. were:i1iherently 
biased against a p,{rticular class of parties. 
The case cpntains claims. which directly involve the Tribe's interests. The Tribe is 
immune from suit; and resolving the claims witl10utthe Tribe~s presence would impair 
I 
their ability to pro~ect fh11t interest Consequently, the Tribe is a necessary and 
indispensable partyto this action. 
1; 
DefcndaneNewtield has also sought dismissal for failure to join and indispensable 
1, 
party and that motion is best addressed here. Although similar, the neGessary and 
{ 
indispensable analysis with regard to Newfield does merit some additional discussion. 
Rule 19 states that a party is a necessary party if "he claims an interest relating to the 
; 
i; 
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence 
may ..• (ii) leave iit1y of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple~ or Qtherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed 
interested." 
The question then becomes whether a disposition of this actioniri the absence of 
the Tribe would l~ave Ne\\-field subject to a substantial risk of incon,sistent oh ligations by 
n . . 
reason of the Tribe's claim.e:d hJterest The Tribe~ s claimed interest-is its ability to 
I 
regulate business a:ctivity on tribal lands. That ability to regulate business activity might 
n 
include issuing diriectives to oil and gas companies and imposing sanctions on c.ompanies 
fornot abiding by}he Tribes directives. One potentfal disposition of this action is that 
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the Court find Newfield liable for one or more of the causes of action claimed by 
Plaintiffs and grant damages against Newfield. Simultaneously, because the Court has no 
sul~ect matter juri~diciion over the Tribe to restrain the T1foe from any action relating to 
the direc.tives it se4ds to oil and gas companies relating to business activities on triha] 
lands, and because· the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to control the other means 
the Tribe uses to enforce its directives, Newfield could become subject to inconsistent 
obligations in Staie Court and before the UTERO Commission. If Newfield fails to abide 
by the directives ot.' UTERO in an effort to avoid state legal claims that may be brought by 
Plaintiffs, Newfiefd may be subject to sanctions imposed by the Tribe. Likewise, if 
I'" 
NeVvfield follows the directiyes of fffERO in an effort to maintain its status with the 
t.t 
Tribe, to continue~its ability to operate on tribal lands. and to avoid tribaLsanctions, 
,: 
Newfield may verj,· conceivably be subject to further civil sanctions in State Court. 
Thus, disposition of this case in the Tribe's absence may leave Nevlfield subject 
._; 
; 
to a substantial ri~k of incurring inconsistent obligations. In this context; the Tribe is a 
' ,. 
necessary party to 'the action. 
l. 
W:hether the Tribe is an indispensable party from Newfield's perspective also 
~. 
merits additional discussion. Again, Rule l 9(b) requires the Court to consider: (1) to v.;hat 
extent a judgmen.t}endered in the. Tribe's absenc,e might be. prejudicial to Newfield; (2) 
the extent to which the prejudfoe can be lessen¢d or avoided; (3) whether a judgment 
,· 
.( 
rendered in the Tribe's absence will be adequate; (4) whether the plaintiff will have an 
i 
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
As discuss:~d above, a judgment rcnderedfa the Tribe's absence has significant 
.~ 
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potential to prejudice Ne\vfiel.d. A 111.ouey judgment against Newfield is not simply a 
sin.gl~ judgment. In the Tribe's absence, Neivfield c<Juld potentially be faced with a 
decision to risk furth.erjudgments in state coutj, face sanctions wiih the U'TERO 
commission~ or cease its operations ·relating to tribal lands altogether. Because of the 
potential for incon~istentjudgments between the state courts and the UTERO 
com.mis.sion, Newfield is placed in the untenable position of operating in potential 
;j 
violation of incon~istent directives from courtsoftwp. jurisdictio11s. 
I 
TI1e Court ~ha5 been. offered no solution to lessen or avoid this potential prejudice 
and; again, cannof conceive of any manner by which it could create a ruling that would 
solve- the potentiaLprejudfoe potentially caused by Newfield being subject to conflicting 
~'· 
and inconsistent 01~dersfrom. this Court. and from the OTERO Commission. 
Factors rel~ting to the indispensable status of a party numbered 3 and 4 are no 
different in the context of Newfield1 s position than they are in regard to the Tribe's 
positjon and need not be reiterated here. Conse.quently, the Tribe is a necessary and 
indispensable party to this action. 
I ( h . Based upon t e foregomg: 
'c/ 
L The P{aintiffs' Motion for Leave to Brief, for Clarification of Order, and 
Rc;lated Relief is d~nied . 
. 1 
2. The Tribe's moti:on to dismiss the Tribe for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
is granted. 
3. The Tribe,s Motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party is 
granted. 
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4. 'Newne_lg;:5J,fotion tq dismiss forfailure fojoin an -indispensable. party is 
·1. . ' '. 
j= 
gt:artted, ,;1 
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lN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
fl\T AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
Ryan Uresk Harvey, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation, e.t al., 
. ) -
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 130000009 
Judge SAMUEL P. CHIARA 
________________ __. _______________ _ 
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss A.1:nended Verified 
Complaint 
The Defendants are divided into three groups, each represented by different counsel. The 
Defendants making this Motion include Nc\v.field Production Company, Newfield Rocky 
' I 
Mountains, Inc., l'{ewfield R~H, LLC, and NeV11field Drilling Services, Inc. ("Newfield"). Mr. 
Christopher R.Hogle represents these Defendants. The Defendants Ute Indian Tribe of the 
,, 
Uintah and Ouray.Reservation ("Tribe"), LC. Welding & Construction, Inc., and Huffman 
Enterprises, Inc., are represented by l'vlr. J. Preston Stieff. The Defendants D. Ray CeBspooch, 
·(° 
Sheila Wopsock, and Jackie La.Rose, in their individual capacities, and as representatives of the 
' 
k 
Ute Indian Tribe, and LaRose Construction Company, Inc., and D.Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C., are 
-t·~ 
re1>resented by Mr. Joel T. Zenger. The Plaintiffs are represented by counsel. Mr. John Hancock, 
Mr:. Clark Allred, ~and Mr; Brad Brother$on. 
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The Court heard mal argument on this Motion1 and on motions of the other Defendants, 
on January 29, 2016. Oral argumeni was provided. from all of the parties on each of the Motions. 
The issues ·were taken under advisement. After careful review of the pleadings, the arguments, 
and the relevant cii.se law,·the Court is prepared tornle on the issues. 
Initially1 th.e Court. notes that based on the Ruling and Order on the Ute Tribe's Motion to 
Dismiss, this matt~r is a.lso dismissed against the Nervfield Defendants. The Court found thatthe 
Ute Tribe was a ncce.ssaty and indispensable party to this action. However,,, the Ute Tribe is 
immune from suit Co11sequentl.y, the matter cannot be maintained against Nevlfield either. The 
,L 
Court adopts that decision here. While that decision makes the additional arguments moo~ the 
:·1:; 




The Defendants move the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint pursuant to 
Rule l 2(b )( 6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule 12(b )( 6) defense is a challenge to 
the plaintiffs right to relief based on the facts the plaintiff has alleged in the complaint. Russell 
".': 
{.~ 
v. Standard Corp., 898·P.2d263 (Utah 1995), 
< 
The court reviews a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to detenuine whether the plaintiff would be 
entitled to relief urtder any state of facts which could be proved in support of its claims. Heiner 
v. S.J Groves & S~ns Co.;. 790 l',2d 107 (Utah Ct App. 1990). The coµrt must "accept the 
factual allegation~' ht the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be 
\t 
drawn from them :i;n the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'' Alvarez v. ·Galetka, 933 P.2d 987; 
989 (Utah 1997). _:, 
't11o sup~~rt a claim for reliet a plaintiff 'must have alleged sufficient facts ... to 
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satisfy eac-11 eleme~1t' of a claim." Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 2013 UT App 26, ~ 16, 296 P .3d 
760 (quoting MBNA Am. Bank NA. v. Goodman, 2006 UT /\pp 276, ,I 6, L40 P .3d 589. "[W]hen 
the pleader complaitts ofconduct described by .•. general terms ..• , the.allegation of the 
conclusion is not siifticient; the pleading must describe the nature or substance of the acts or 
words c.omplained of.n Tflifliams v. State Farm Ins. Co.,, 656 P.2d 966~ 971 (Utah 1982). 
H[ G]enera1 accusations in the nature of conclusions ... will not stand up against a motion to 
.':c 
dismiss." Heath111;cm v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah I 962); UtahSteel & Iron Co. v. Bosch, 
475 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah 1970). 
Vi 
The Plai.nt~ffs allege that the Newfield Defendants have conspired with the other 
~i 
Defendants to boycott or blacklist the Plaintiffs' business. The Plaintiffs claim the Newfield 
,. 
Defendants are liable for tortious interference with economic relations:, extortion, unlav.rful 
I' 
restraint of trade, blacklisting, and civil conspiracy. The factual allegations the Plaintiffs rely on 
.. 
to support their claims against Newfield are made in paragraphs 70-74 in the Amended Verified 
Complaint, "vhich. state-s; 
70. Sincf the March 20, 2013, threats by Director Wopsock, the oil and g;:is 
companies; including Newfield, have refused to allow any business \Vho leases 
Plaintiffs' ;equipment or utilizes Plaintiffs' Products to provide services . 
. ;. 
71. By en~·ail dated March 22, 2013 1 Newfield informed Ryan that it would not be 
utilizing tJaintiffs 1 products or services per the direction of the "UTERO 
committee/' 
~._,. . 
72. Newfield'$ and other oil and gas companies' cooperation wifu the unlawful an.ct 
ultra vires actioiis of tribal officials empowers said officials and is the direct and 
proximate·:cnuse of damages to Plaintiffs . 
. , 
73. Since ~March 2013, Plaintiffs' bave lost approximately $80,000.00 per day in 
revenues r;~ the result of Newfield and other oil and gas compank~s cooperating in 
the unla\\'i}tl.U'TER.6bl~cklist and boycott of Plaintiffs. · 
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74. Ryan l_las been contacted by oil and gas companies, including Newfield, and 
told that they cannot do business with Plaintiffs or work with anyone that does 
business with Plaintiffs based on their cooperation with and suppo1t of the 
UTERO officials. 
The Plaint1ffs also submitted attachments to a Motion for Temporarj Restraining Order 
which was filed at,_the satne time as the original Complaint. The attachments concern 
., 
communications tliat UTERO had with Newfield <)onceming Rocks Off; and Newfield,s 
notification to Pla#1tiffthat Newfield would no longer be utilizing the Plai.ntiff onjobs. The 
,I. 
lf· . 
parties referencedJhese attachments in the subseqtient motions. Although foundation was never 
provided for the d6cuments) none of the parties obje.cted to the attachments on an evidentiary 
l 
basis. Nor did any; of the parties oppose the Court1s consideration of the attachments in 
(?Onjunction with ~edding the Motions. 
r~ 
The March,20, 2013, UTERO letter notified Newfield that the acce-ss pem1it for Rocks 
,f} 
Off, Inc. - Ryan lfarvey had been revoked. The letter indicated that companies doing business 
I• 
Oll the reservation;may be penalized or sanctioned for using Rocks Off, Inc. - Ryan Harvey. In 
I 
response to the letter, a representative of Ne'A-iiekl.-not:ified Ryan Harvey byemai.l that Newfield. 
would not be using RocksOff~ Inc., due to the UTERO directive. 
t. 
The facts set forth in the Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint establish, at most, that 
... 
Newfield was not{fied by UTERO that Rocks Off's access pe1mit had been revoked and were no 
,i 
l, 
longer authorized .'to conduct work on tribal land, ari.d that Newfield follo\ved that dire,ctiv~ by no 
longer utilizing Rocks Off for work on tribal land. Those minimal factual allegations fail to 
support the variotts claims the Plaintiffs set forth~ The facts do not supporta finding that 
\;, 
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business. The facts do not supporta claim that Newqeld agreed to assist in harming the 
• i 
Plaintiffs' busines~. The complaint must give tl1e detendant "fair notice of the nature and basis 
or gtot!nds of the claim ..• ." Zoumadakis v, Uintah ct.sin Med. Ctr., 2005 UT App 325, 12, 122 
P.3d 891. The factual allegations made against New e.ld fail to provide adequate notk:e. of the 
actions complaine<;l of. For that reason, and for tbe 1.1 sons listed below~ the Defendant 
Newfield's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
: ~ 
l. " Tortious lQ.ter.fe:renc:e with Ec-0nomic.Rela:tio s. 
The eleme~ts of a claim for tortious interfere ce with economic relations include "'( 1) that 
the defendant inte~1tionally interfered with the plainti s existing or potential economic relations, 
(2) for an impropir purpose or by improper means, ( ) causing injw-y tQ the plaintiff" Leigh 
(1 ' ''' . ' ' '' ; . . 
Furniture & Carp<?-t Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 ( tah 1982). The Plaintiffs allege that the 
~ . . 
Defendants "havdntentiorially interfered with the Pl intiff..<;' existing and potential economic 
;_ 
li 
relations." (Am. Comp!., at\ 117.). The Plaintiffs d, not provide any explanation of the 
.. , : 
... ': 
Defendants' actioAs or facts to support their claim. " G]eneral accusations in the nature of 
conclt1sions ... will not stand up against a motion to dismiss." Heathttian. 13 Utah 2d at 268, 
3 72 P,2d at 991. The aUegations are insufficient to provide the Defendants fair notice of the 
•·· .. I 




IL Extoliion. i. 
' 
Utah does not recognize a civil claim for ext rtion. See Jensen v. America ·s W110lesale 




also W11ipple V. State qfUtah) Case No. 2:l0Mcv;..811 PAK, 2011 WL 4368568 *17 (D. Utah 
,. I 
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i\Ugr 253 2011.)(Report an(} Rec9rnmendation)(llllf)Ublislled)('~ums, be_ca,µ~e apriva.t~right of 
. . . . . ' 
action do.es not exi~t fo Utah 10.rtheft and theft by extortion, ·1tn::,cqurttecom;tn~hc.ls;that 
. Plaintift"-s third ca~~e ofaction [fof;.textortion,'] be-dismissed;'~). Conseq_uentlyi the Plah1tifts' 
Fourth,Claim for llelieffnr-e.xtortiori is dismissed. 
IIL AntitnistClaim~ 
The PJaintiffs allege-in. the-it Fifth Claitn for Relief tha.Hhe Def~n.~ai1ts conspired wi~b the 
;.~-" 
othetDefendants h;i:vi.olation <:,f Ofah~s Antitrust Act and the UtahX!onst. Art. XII~§ 20. The 
L .· . . . 
lJtal.l. AntitnistAct-:explic~t}y adopts and follows interpretations of federal antitrost1aws, Ste § 
t 
76 .. 10-3J 18~ ·A viplatron ofthe Sherman Act ~"requires tl1atthere be. a contract, combination ... 
p 
ot conspiracy ••. \ [i]ndcpe.ndentactionis not proscribed/~ ,Section 76-10~3104 ofthe Utah 
Anti.trust Act reqll!res that .. t[e]very contract~ combination in the fonn of trust or otherwise: or 
il 
conspiracy in restt~nt of trade or commerce is declared to be illegal." A claim. for violation. of· 
;. 
/· 
the antitrust laws ~~quires,pleadirtg facts sho'wJng a concerted 0{1urt: among'the d~foµdaq.t§~ ;Tn 
' [ . . . . . . . 
Utah,the facts must support~(~ 'meeting of the minds' Qrt a COlllln:Qn cobjeqt-or course of, 
:r 
action/'fTamlins~~' 2013 :Ut App 26 at 1[ 19.(quotiug Petersen v. Delta Air Line.rt lire;~ 2002.UT 
(i. 
App 56;4J 12A2 P.3d 1253. 
The Plaintiff:4; ofter no facts alleging-thatNew:fietd arni ·the other Defendants had a H . 
fneeting of the m~ds to boycott the Plairitiffa' business. All that is alleged is UT.ERO informed 
·< 
~-' 
Newfield thatthe :R,qck_s ()ff was no longer allowed to tiop.dii¢tJ:msiriess o:n. b.jbaUarid, aµ:d 
,,. 
Newfield relayed the message to the Plaintiffs ·ex:plaiuing that Nevmeld · was nofgoing to. do: 
•;: ' .. , . 
. 
bµ_sJn:ess \VJ.th Pla,ihtiffs duet• the 1)TERO notice~ The Plaitttfffs' -claim merely recites the. 
eleme11ts o.f an. antitrust<!l~in1. '~(A] com.plaint fa sulijectfo di~:rni.ssalwlwre it doe.s: little 111ore 
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: than iec.ite the rel~vant•antitrustlawsn and 1'the tise pfantit:rtt~tbuzz wotdsdoes .notsupplx the 
• fa~1uaLcircumsta:rices necessary to support c<.mdttsoryall~g,ijJions~" Tat·v~ Hogan, 453 F.:3._d 
l 244r J :?61(10th Cir .. 7006). The Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim ftit Relief against Newfield is disrnissed, 
V. Blacklisting 
The Plaihtfffs ~·claim for blacklisting is derived from Article. XII § 19 and Article XVI § 4 
of:ihe t.Jtah C(mstitution. AuticleXII § l 9 provides: 
,., 
Eachperso.nin Uta1lis free·to obtain m,1d e.nJoy employment: \.vhenevtr pos~ible a:n.d 
a person ot~orporatlon, 9r their agent, serv~t,, pr employee may no,t rnalicio11~ly 
interfere w;r,th ·any person from obtaining employment or enjoying ernp!Qyment from 
any other P.?tson or corporation. 
·: ~ 
Artfole.,:\.\11 § 4 stAttes: 
".. :.~ 
The exchange of bl~ck lists by railroad companies, or other corporations, 
associatio1is cir persons is prohibited. 
The Plaintiffs Am~·nded. Verified ·complaint fails to a!.lege fapts conceniing the exchange of 
i ~-. 
~ r 
blacklistst or malig1ous interference with I}taintiffs' emplO)'nient, on the part of Newfield. The 
r 
-.~ 
plead.Ja.cts allege '.~ewfietd. receiyed an cmailfrom UTERO conccrning·Rocks Off: and in 
compHance with t~e UTERO Or<l.inance govemit1g work done on tribal•grotinds} Newfield no 
~ . 
longer -u.sed Rock~1C)ff as a contractor or subcontractor. The facts.allege thatN<:n-Vfield follo;.ved 
~- ~ ' 
} 
the dir~c.tion ofU1:'I1;RO. by not using the Plair1tiff for \vo:rk qom,pleted: g~_tfjbal land .b.e¢a11se the 
Plaintiff was no 16-hger licensed to do wo.rk on.triballand. The Plaintiffs~ cause.ofactfonlor 
i'f· 
blaqk:li:$ti.ng is d:i.s.1µ,issed. 
!:,. 
IV. Civil Con~~iracy 
11 
A civil•co1ispif:acy c.lain1requires ·''(1) a.combinatiQn.oftwo.or.more•persons; (2}an. 
qbject..to he acyi-'~1~plisried" '(3) a:me¢.ti11g ofthe minds {1rt the object or c6urse f>f° ac=tioil, '.(4)_ on:e (1r 
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more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof/' ~Kwrada v. Mendoza, 
2012 UT App 82, _'if 13, 275 PJd 1024; 1029. A civil conspiracy claim alsoqtequir1~.s as one its 
essential elements{tU1deilying tortt and "a plaintiffis obligated tu plead the.~xistence ofsuch a 
tort.'' Id. The Plaintiffs Anlended Verified Complaint does notallege any facts concerning an 
underlying tort. Nbr have the Plaintiffs alleged any facts showing Newfield and the other 
Defendants crone to a meeting of the minds to commit an unlawful act against the Plaintiffs. 
Therefore, the P1aintiffs Seventh Claim for Relief .is dismissed. 
>,<i 
The Ne\\rfield Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
Dated this i;J:l{_ day ofMarch, 2016. 
,· 
f 
BYTHE COURT: J 1/17 :,_· ~~~
SAt\.fCJEL P. CI--IIARA~ District Court Ju~ge 
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IN THE .EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JN AND FOR DUCHESNE.COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
Ryan Uresk Harvey, et al., 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation, et al., 
) 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 130000009 
Judge SA..\.fUEL :p. CHIARA 
This matter is bef'ore the Court on the Defendants; Motion to Dismiss or in the 
Alternative Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint. 
The Defendants are divided into three groups, each represented by different counsel. The 
Defendants making this Motion include D. Ray Cesspooch. Sheila Wopsock, and Jackie LaRose~ 
("individual Defe?:dants") in their individual capacities, and as representatives of the Ute Indian 
Tribe. and LaRose Construction Company, Inc., and D.Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. These 
r 
Defondants are represented by Mr. Joel T. Zenger. The Defendants Ute Iridian Tribe of the 
l 
Uintah and Ouray·ReservaJion ("Tribe"), L.C. Welding & Constructionr lnc .• and Huf.finan 
Enterprises) Inc., are represented by Mr. J. Preston Stieff. Defendants Newfield Production 
Company, Newfield Rocky MoW1tains, lnc., Nev.rfield RlvII, LLC, and Ne\:v:field Drilling 
,, 
Servkes, Inc., arec'n::presented by Mr. ChristopherR.Hogle. The Plaintiffs are represented by 
·;:· 
counsel, Mr. John Hancock, Mr. Clark Allred, and Mr. Brad Brotherson, 
Page 1 of 5 
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The Court heard oral argument on this Motion, arid on the motions of the other 
Defendants, on January 29, 2016. Oral argument was provided from all of the parties on each of 
the Motions. The issues were taken under advisement. After careful revieiv of the pleadings, the 
arguments, and th~ relevant case law, the Court is prepared to rule on the issues. 
The individual Defendants offer many of the same firguments made by the Tribe in th~ir 
Motion to Dismiss: The Court adopts the Ruling and Order on the Tribe's }.1.otion to Dismiss in 
r 
as far as the two ~1otions overlap. Specifically~ the Court finds that the Tril,e is a necessary and 
r, 
indispensable parij:• which is immune from suit Consequently, the case is dismissed for that 
reason, as well as the additional reasons listed be.low. The Com1's Ruling :m.d Order here \vil1 
address the argun{euts the individual. Defendants offer that diffel' from the Tribe's. 
d . 
I. D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose Construction. 
The Plainfitis have asserted claims against D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaR.ose 
! 
:l 
Co.n..;;truction, apart from the claims made against the. businesses' owners~ Defendants Dino Ray 
·, 
Cesspooch and Jackie La.Rose. 'To support a. claim for relief, a plaintiff '.t.nust have alleged 
suffidentfocts ... to satisfy each element' of a claim.,, Tomlinson v. NCKCorp., 296 P.3d 760 
(Utah App. 2013) ~uperseded on other grounds 2014 UT 53,345 P.2d 523 (Utah 2014)(quoting 
\ .~ 
fvfBNA Am. B(lnk kA. v. Goodman, 140 P.3d 589, 591 (Utah App. 2006)). The Plaintiff.,' 
•: 
Amended Verifie,t Complaint does not assert any facts supporting th~ claims made against these 
:::~ 
f'. 
two corporate Def~ndants. The Amended Verified Complaint only alleges .facts regarding the• 
'· individual Defendants' actions as individuals and as govemment officials of the Tribe. 
Consequently, the~Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be grant€;:d ~gainst 
' 
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I 
li 
Rule l2(b)(6) for the Defendants D, Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose Construction. 
IL Dino Ray Cesspooch, Jackie LaRose~and Sheila Wopsock. 
The next i$sueJs wliether suit can be maintained against the individual Defendants, or if 
sovereign immunity bats.:the suit. The Plaintiffs' claims are brought against the individual 
Defendants both in their individual capacity and intheir capacity as governmental officials of the 
Tribe. The Defenqants:argu,e sovereign hnrn.unity applies to them as government officials of the 
C ~ 
Tribe. The Plaintilfs f¼tguethat sovereign immunity docs notapply because the actions taken by 
1· 
the officials were outside the scope of their governmental authority. 
:;.-
The Ute Tribe's sovereign immunity does not apply to the individual Defendants acting in 
f 
their individual capacities. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game of State of1flash.~ 433 U.S. 
l65, J 73, 97 S. ct 2616) 2621 (l977)("[t]he successful asserti<)nof tribal sovereign immunity in 
this case does nodmpairthe authority of the state court to adjudicate the rights of the individual 
!~ 
11 
defendants over \~~om it properly obtained personal jurisdiction. 'l In Maxwell v. Cty. of San 
Diego, the 9th Cir~~it considered whether paramedics employed by the Viejas Band's fire 
;, 
r' 
department were immune from suit for actions committed by the para.medics in their individual 
capacities. 708 F:3d l 075, 1089 (gth Cir. 2013). The cou1t held sovereign immunity did not bar 




and money damages wm;dd not be paid from the tribal treaslll'y. Id. 
( -~ . 
\J. 
,: 
The determining factor in deciding whether a tribe's sovereign immunity extends to the 
,'.l 
tribe's govemmen~ officials is whether the sovereign "is the real, substantial party in interest/~ 
Frazier v. Simmo~s~ 254 F.3d 1247, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001). \Vhether a tribe is the real party in 
interest is decided,by looking at the reliefsought. id. ~'[T]he general ndeisthat relief sought 
Page 3 of 5 
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nominally against ~n officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree ,.vould operate against 
the latte.r." J>ennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 900 (1984) . 
. ·, 
Converseh', soveriign immunity does not bar the suit if the relfofsought is only againstthe 
individual tribal officer personally. A.Iden v .. Maine, 527 U.S. 706: 757!, 119 S.Ct. 2240 {10th cir. 
2008). 
Here, the relief sought by the Plaintiffs indicates that the Ute Tribe·is the real party in 
interes.t. The Plaii{tiffs seek declaratory relief against the Tribe, UTERO; and. the UTERO 
·1. 
officials. The Plaintiffs request the Court issue a declaratory order limiting the Tribe> UTERO, 
and UTERO o.ffici-,~s from regulating private business activities of non-Indians outside of the 
f 
tribal land. ·n1is type of re]ief directly involves the Tribe,, not the individual Defendants 
personally. The Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Tribe, UTERO~ and UTERO 
officials, from acting in a ·way which interferes with the Plaintiffs' business. Again, this type of 
reliefonly applies!to the Tribe and the Tribe's officials and not the individual Defendants. The 
~ :. 
i: 
relief Plaintiffs are seeking is against the Tribe. Therefore, the Tribe is the real party in interest 
and sovereign imrt}unity also applies to the individual Defendants. 
,;' 
t•, 
Even assuming that the individual Defendants are being sued in their individual 
capacities, and the Plaintiffa were not seeking damages from. the Tribe, tbe case must still be 
1, 
d1smissed. The Piaintiffs allege that the UTE-RO officials acted beyond th~ scope of authority 
:.I 
given them to regi;ilate business on tribal lnnd. The authority given to the UTERO officials to 
'> 
.. 
regulate business f.n theirjurisdiction derives from the UTERO Ordinance. Whether the UTERO 
officials exceedelthe scope of authority given to them by the UTERO Ordinance necessarily 
requires examining and interpreting the UTE.RO Ordinance. Interpreting tribal laws is outside 
Page 4 of 5 
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the scope ofa state district courfs general jurisdiction. "Adjudicatio1i of such matters by any 
nontribal court alsq infririgf!s upon tribal law~making authority, bepause tt.ibal,courts are best 
qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.', Iowa Mut; Ins. Co. v, LaPlante1. 107 S.CL 971,977 
(1987). 
The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. The claims asserted. against Defendants 
D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose Construction are dismissed pttrsuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The 
claims asserted against the individual Defendants are dismissed pursuant Rule 12(b)(l). 
Dated thi/2( day of March, 2016. 
r 
BY THE COURT: 
SA1'.1lJEL P. CHIARA, District Court Judg_e 
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IN THEEIGHTHJUDIC.IALDISTRICT COURT 
rN A.ND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
Ryan Uresk Harvey~ etal., 
Plaintiffs, 
Ute Indlan Tribe'ofthe Uintah and Ouray 




· RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 130000009 
Judge SAMUELP. CHIARA 
\this matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs~ Motion to File Supplemental Pleadings . 
. \ 
The :Plaintiffs req~est to be allowed to supplement their pleadings to include eve11ts which 
have taken place since the inception of this lawsuit. The Plaintiffs make this request pursuant to 
·1 
Rule l S(d) of the 1)tah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in part: 
Upon motion ofa party the court may, upon reasonable notice, an~ up<>n such tetms 
as are just;· pennithim to serve £t $Upplemental .Ple~ding settingfoxfu transactio11s or 
occurrences or events which have happened since the date o:r the pleading soughtto 
be suppleQ.1ented. 
A rule 15(d) moti?fl is•~4addressed to the sound discretion of the cowt. and . .leave to serve.a 
stipplerfi.~rital ple~ing ~~h9uld·be iiberally grantedlllliess-good re.asottexJsts·for denyingleaveJ 
such a~ prejudice lo the d~fendants. '" Soulhwesi N,urseries, LLC v. Florists lv/utual /nsurancei 
lnc.i 266 F.Supp. 2s 1253~ 1256 (D.Colo. 2003)(quoting Walker v. UnitedParcel Serv., Inc., 240 
. 11 
F.~d 12681 1278 (tOth CirM 2001)). "Refusing leay~to amend is generally only jµstified upon a 
Paget of 4 
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·~· 
showing of undue delay, undue prejudic.e to the opposing party~ bad faith or dilatory motive~ 
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously a1lowed, or futility of amendment" Frank 
v. US~ We.st, Inc., 3 F3d 13571 1365 (10'h Cir. 1993). 
,, 
!• 
The Plaintiffs' Motion is a clear attempt to bolster their chances of surviving the various 
motions to dismisJ filed by the Defendants. The three motions made by the Defendants have 
been fully briefed 'and s1ibmittcd for. d_ecision. '11Je Court heard oral argument on all of the 
motions on January 29, 2016. Based on the extensive briefing in thost! motions1 it is apparent 
1: 
that the parties spent a. considerable amountoftime and effort producing them. The Court also 
spent a considerabie amount of time and eflbrt researching and revie,ving the arguments. The 
~' <1 
Defendants) motions were also pending for an extended period of time. The Defendants 
including the UT~RO officials made their first motion to dismiss on May-l,2013. The Newfield. 
Defendants made their .tnotion to dismiss on July 7, 201--t The Ute Tribe made their motion on 
December 16~ 2015. Attempting to insert new factual allegations into the pleadings after the 
i. ~ 
passage of this amount of time~ after the effort to produce the motions,and hold oral argument, 
:•i 
would be unjust:. :- . 
=t 
)-
The Defe0:~ants would be unduly prejudiced by allovving the pleadh1gs to be amended in 
effort to defeat their motions to dismiss. The Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit nearly three years 
ago. The Defendants have been waiting nearly that long to have their rnotions conside.reg. 
Requiring the Defendants to remake their motions~ and to wait longer to have the motions 
:..·· 
l' 
resolved, would hq unjust. The Plaintiffs had an opportunity to draft their complaint as they saw 
}: 
fit. The Plaintiffa\vere given an additional opportunity to amend theircon1plai11t on September 
,.( . 
4, 2013. The Plai~ltiffs literally had years to amend their pleadings in light of the Defendantst 
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1 .. ,i\ 
'W 
motions. Allowing the Plaintiffs an additional opportunity to defeat the pending motions is not 
allowed by mles regarding 1uotion pleading, and would be an unjust result. 
Neverthel~~s; the ptairitiffs~ Motion is moot. The Court grantedthe-Defendantsi motions, 
dismissing this matter in its entirety. The Court provided various reasons for dismissing the 
matter, including the fact that the Ute Tribe was a necessary and indispensabl~ party to this 
action. Sovereign1immunity applies to the Ute Tribe. Therefore, the. lawsuit cannot be 
maintained in a. sclte district court. Furthemwre, this Lawsuit requires this Court to analyze and 
interpret the Ute ~ribe}s UTERO ordinance. A state district court does not have jurisdiction over 
... 
a sovereign, nor can it interpre.t the laws of the sovereign. None of the factual allegations offered 
.. 
'.1• 
by the Plaintiffs changes that result Even if the Court were to allow the-Plaintiffs the 
~i 
opportunity to amend their pleadings~ the outcome would be the same, The matter would be 
dismissed. 
A.dditionally, the Plaintiffs' Motion does not explain how the various factual allegations 




allegations the Pl~i,ntiffc; allege have occurred since the inception of this action. The Plaintiffs 
:1 
suggest that the C~mrt examine the factual allegations and dete1mine \Vhich ones may be relevant 
i: 
in deciding 1he mo_tions to dismiss. The Court declines the Plaintiffs~ invitation. The Plaintiffa' 
responsibility is to; offer the facts and explain how they apply to the clah:ns~ and to the arguments 
made. 
,,, 
The Plaintiffs, Motion to File Supplemental Pleadings is denied. 
Dated this;.;~. l;t? day·ofMan;h, 2016. 
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/~w:it1;_,r?it>,. 
The Order of tlui Court is stutcd bdow: X .,- ' •· \. \, 
Dated: May 12, 2016 /s/ SAMl~~ lA! 
09::19:51I /\M Districl'CI.'> · ' 
J. Preston Stieff (4764) 
J. PRESTON STIEFF LAW OFFICES 
110 South Regent Street, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6002 
Email: jps@StieffLaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants Ute Indian Tribe 
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation; 
L. C. Welding & Construction, Inc.; and 
Huffman Enterprises. Inc. 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY - ROOSEVELT 
STATE OF UTAH 
RYAN URESK HARVEY, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH 
AND OURAY RESERVATION, et al., 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 130000009 
Judge Samuel P. Chiara 
\~{n(\/(:~:::l~•.• 
This matter came before the Court on the following five motions: (1) the Motion to 
Dismiss Amended Verified Complaint filed by the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation ("Tribe"), LC. Welding & Construction, Inc., and Huffman 
Enterprises, Inc.; (2) the Motion to Dismiss Amended Verified Complaint filed by 
Defendants Newfield Production Company, Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield 
RMI, LLC, and Newfield Drilling Services, Inc. ("Newfield"); (3) the Motion to Dismiss or 
in the Alternative Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint filed 
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by Defendants D. Ray Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsock, and Jackie LaRose ("individual 
Defendants'l in their individual capacities, and as representatives of the Ute Indian 
Tribe, and LaRose Construction Company, Inc., and D. Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C.~ (4) 
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Brief, for Clarification of Order, and Related Relief; 
and (5) the Plaintiffs' Motion to File Supplemental Pleadings. 
The Defendants are divided into three groups, each represented by different 
counsel. Defendants Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation ("Tribe"), 
L.C. Welding & Construction, Inc., and Huffman Enterprises, Inc. are represented by Mr. 
J. Preston Stieff. Defendants D. Ray Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsock, and Jackie LaRose, 
in their individual capacities, and LaRose Construction Company, Inc., and D. Ray C. 
Enterprises, L.L.C., are represented by Mr. Daniel S. Press and Mr. Craig H. Howe. 
Defendants D. Ray Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsocl<, and Jackie LaRose, in their official 
capacities, are represented by Mr. Patrick S. Boice. Defendants Newfield Production 
Company, Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC, and Newfield Drilling 
Services, Inc., are represented by Mr. Christopher R. Hogle. The Plaintiffs are 
represented by counsel, Mr. John Hancock, Mr. Clark Allred and Mr. Brad Brotherson. 
The Court heard oral argument on the three dismissal motions on January 29, 
2016. Oral argument was provided from all of the parties on each of the Motions. Tl1e 
issues were taken under advisement. Pursuant to U.R.C.P. 52(a), after careful review 
of the pleadings, the arguments, and the relevant case law, the Court entered four 
Rulings and Orders on March 28, 2016. The Rulings and Orders having fully resolved 
this matter, the Court is now prepared to enter its final judgment. 
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The Court having considered the pleadings and arguments of the parties, and the 
relevant case law, and having entered its Rulings and Orders, and being otherwise fully 
advised, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
I. Dismissal Motion of Defendants Ute Indian Tribe 
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. LC Welding & Construction, 
and Huffman Enterprises. Inc. 
1.This matter came before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Amended Verified 
Complaint filed by the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
('Tribe'l LC. Welding & Construction, Inc., and Huffman Enterprises, Inc. 
2.The portion of this motion seeking dismissal on the grounds that the Tribe is an 
indispensable party is joined by all of the defendants. 
3. The Defendants move the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Defendants argue this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the Tribe 
enjoys sovereign immunity. Additionally, the Defendants argue that the Verified 
Complaint should be dismissed as to all Defendants because the Tribe is a 
necessary and indispensable party pursuant to Rule 19. 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
4.Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional issue. Ramey Constr. Co., Inc. v. The 
Apache Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 3151 318 (10th Cir. 1982). 
An Indian tribe is immune from suit unless the tribe has waived its immunity or 
Congress authorized the suit Kiovla Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing 
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Technologies 1 Inc., 523 U.S. 751 1 754 (1988). In order to waive tribal sovereign 
immunity Congress must unequivocally express its intent to do so 1 or the tribe 
must clearly vvaive immunity. C&L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi 
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001 ); see also Santa Clara v. 
Pueblo v. Martinez: 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). "Absent an effective waiver or 
consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a 
recognized Indian tribe." Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of State of 
Wash. 1 433 U.S. 165 1 172 (1977). 
5.The Ute Indian Tribe's Law and Order Code describes the extent of the Tribe's 
sovereign immunity and the circumstances in which the Tribe's sovereign 
immunity may be waived. Section 1-8-5 states: 
Except as required by federal law 1 or the Constitution and Bylaws of the 
Ute Indian Tribe, or as specifically waived by a resolution or ordinance of 
the Business Committee specifically referring to such 1 the Ute Indian Tribe 
shall be immune from suit in any civil action, and its officers and 
employees immune from suit for any liability arising from the performance 
of their official duties. 
U.L.O.C. Section 1-8-5. The UTERO Ordinance does waive sovereign immunity in 
certain circumstances. Section 13.3 of the UTERO Ordinance states: 
The Tribe "hereby agrees to waive its sovereign immunity for the sole and 
limited purpose of enforcement of the terms of this Ordinance. This 
waiver is expressly limited to injunctive and declaratory relief with respect 
to the enforcement of the terms of this Ordinance and does not include 
monetary damages. This limited waiver is not, and should not be 
construed as a blanket waiver of the Tribe's sovereign immunity. Under 
no circumstances shall the tribal funds of the Tribal Treasury be subject to 
any award for damages. 
UTERO Ord.I Sec. 13.3. The waiver is limited to enforcement of the UTERO Ordinance 
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only, and is not a blanket \Naiver, or \Naiver for any other purpose. The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recently interpreted this section of the UTERO Ordinance and held: 
Under the terms of that ordinance, the Tribe has indeed 'agree[d] to waive 
its sovereign immunity.' But the ordinance explains that this ·waiver is not 1 
and should not be construed as a blanket waiver of the Tribe's sovereign 
immunity.' Instead, tl1e waiver exists 1for the sole and limited purpose of 
enforcement of the terms of [the] Ordinance ... .' 
Ute Indian Ttibe of the Uintah and Ouray Rese,vation v. State of Utah, 790 F.3d 1000. 
1010 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting UTE RO Ordinance). The Court further explained: 
id. 
[E]ven assuming without granting that the defendants1 counterclaims could 
somehow be described as an effort to ·enforce' the ordinance - itself a 
seriously questionable notion - the ordinance is enforceable only before 
tribal courts and the Tribe's UTERO Commission. Nowhere does the 
waiver permit other parties to hale the Tribe before a nontribal tribunal and 
this court enjoys no authority to rewrite for the defendants the waiver the 
Tribe has written for itself. 
6.The Plaintiffs argue the Tribe has waived sovereign immunity by the UTERO 
Code Section 13.3. Consequently, the Plaintiffs argue that a suit against the 
Tribe can be maintained. The Plaintiffs further argue that the basis for their 
Verified Complaint is the allegation that the Defendants have acted outside the 
scope of UTERO and attempted to conduct illegal and unlawful activities outside 
of the boundaries of the Reservation. The Plaintiffs argue the Defendants acted 
ultra vires and their claims do not implicate the UTERO Code but are actionable 
state tort, statutory, and constitutional claims. The Plaintiffs argue that they are 
not bound to prosecute their claims in tribal court or tt1e before the UTERO 
Commission. 
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?.Whether Plaintiff is attempting to enforce terms of the UTERO Ordinance or 
not, the result is the same: dismissal against the Tribe for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. If the Plaintiffs' claims against the Tribe are not brought pursuant to 
the UTERO Ordinance, then sovereign immunity applies barring the claims 
because tl1ere has been no clear and express waiver of sovereign immunity 
outside of the terms of the UTE RO Ordinance. If Plaintiffs' claims are brought to 
enforce the UTERO Ordinance, those claims must have been brought in tribal 
court. The waiver of sovereign immunity in the UTERO Ordinance explains it is 
"for the sole and limited purpose of enforcement of the terms of [the] Ordinance." 
UTERO Ord., Sec. 13.3. The waiver "is not, and should not be construed as a 
blanket waiver of the Tribe's sovereign immunity." Id. However, as explained by 
the Tenth Circuit, according to the UTERO Ordinance, the claims can only be 
brought before the tribal court and the Tribe's UTERO Commission. Under either 
scenario, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Tribe. 
8.Additionally 1 the Plaintiffs argue the Tribe waived sovereign immunity by 
making a general appearance in this litigation. Plaintiffs' memorandum contained 
no authority for this position but referenced the argument contained in a 
memorandum filed by them on May 15, 2013. That memorandum also appears 
devoid of any legal authority for the proposition that a tribe waives sovereign 
immunity by making a general appearance in a case. At oral argument, Plaintiffs' 
counsel argued that the Tribe had made a general appearance in this case by 
seel<ing a dismissal of the entire case for failure to join an indispensable party. 
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Counsel then provided the Court with three cases that allegedly support the 
position. Those cases had not been cited during briefing and were objected to by 
defense counsel. The Court allowed the cases in an effort to include all 
applicable legal authority to assist it in deciding a complicated case. The Court 
authorized defense counsel to file a supplemental response to the three cases 
provided by Plaintiffs. Defendants submitted the supplemental response as 
allowed by the Court on February 5, 2016. 
9.On February 8: 2016, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that the Court grant 
leave to allow full briefing of the issue of whether the Tribe's sovereign immunity 
was waived by making a general appearance. It is a mystery to this Court why 
Plaintiffs believe they should be allowed more argument on this point. The Tribe 
asked for dismissal of the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity in its 
motion. The Plaintiffs filed a twenty-page memorandum in response that 
included an argument that the Tribe had made a general appearance in this case 
and that it had waived sovereign immunity. Then, at oral argument Plaintiffs 
argued that same point and the Court allowed Plaintiffs to present case law that 
had not been provided in briefing. Obviously, Plaintiffs knew waiver of sovereign 
immunity in any of its iterations was at issue or they would not have appeared at 
oral arguments armed with case law on that point. Tl1e fact that Plaintiffs failed to 
fully brief their defenses to the primary issue raised by the Tribe in its motion for 
dismissal is inexplicable. There is no confusion on this point. The Tribe claims it 
is immune from suit in state court. The defense to this claim is waiver of 
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immunity. Waiver potentially occurs in a number of ways. Any of the potential 
ways by which Plaintiff claims the Tribe waived its immunity must be raised by 
Plaintiff. Procedurally, arguments are not made by a series of separate 
memoranda. Rather, all of a responding party's arguments on a point are 
expected to be made in a single responsive pleading. There is only one reason 
why any further briefing was allowed by the Court following oral argument. 
Namely, that Plaintiffs attempted to introduce case law during oral argument that 
had not previously been briefed. It was only appropriate that Defendants be given 
the opportunity to address case law not previously disclosed before the Court 
made its ruling. That necessary briefing opens no new doors to Plaintiffs. 
1 a.Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed the cases belatedly cited by the 
Plaintiffs for the proposition that a tribe waives sovereign immunity by making a 
general appearance in a case and a discussion of each is had below. The Court 
first notes that subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time: Barnard v. 
Wasserman 855 P.2d 243, 247-48 (Utah 1993) ("This court has made clear that 
challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and cannot be 
waived by the parties. 11 ). 
11.ln Friends of East Willits Valley v. County of Mendocino, 123 CaL Rptr. 2d 
708, 711 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), under the heading of "[b]ackground" the court 
stated: 
In a prior unpublished decision we rejected initial challenges to trial court 
jurisdiction over the Tribe, concluding that because the Tribe has made a 
general appearance, it waived its sovereign immunity. 
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Additionally 1 in the 'ld]iscussion" section of the ruling, the court stated: 
Indeed, the Tribe waived sovereign immunity previously when it made a 
general appearance in this case. It also expressly waived sovereign 
immunity in connection \rvith enforcement of the Tribal/County Agreement. 
Id. at 715. Notably, the statement by the Court tl1at the Tribe had waived its sovereign 
immunity by making a general appearance in the case cites no legal authority for that 
position. Tl1us, without furtl1er explanation, that statement carries no weight. The 
California Court's decision is not controlling and because it contains no discussion and 
cites no authority, it cannot be persuasive. It is conceivable that the Tribe expressly 
waived immunity in its pleadings when it appeared in the case, or perhaps, it sought 
some affirmative relief. However, because the prior case is unpublished and because 
the published case offers no authority nor explanation for the assertion, the case is of 
no assistance to this Court's determination of the issue. Further, the Tribe in Friends of 
East Willits Valley expressly waived its sovereign immunity when it entered into a 
specific tribal/county agreement that was at issue in the lawsuit. Thus, in the face of an 
express waiver contained in the written agreement, it is difficult to determine how much 
consideration was given to the issue of waiver by general appearance or whether the 
two were one in the same in that instance. 
12.Next, the Plaintiffs cite Nushake, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, No. CGC-05-
441299, 2011 Cal. Super. LEXIS 319, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 29, 2011 ). In 
Nushake, the court held that the tribe waived sovereign immunity by directly and 
unequivocally consenting to enforcement of the settlement agreement in 
California State Court. Id. at **35-40. Nushake's holding, therefore, is unhelpful 
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in this case because the Ute Tribe has not similarly consented to enforcement of 
any agreement here at issue in Utah State Court. 
13.Finally, the Plaintiffs cite United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 
1981 ). In Oregon, the Yakima Tribe moved to intervene in a lawsuit under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). The Oregon Court held that because 
the tribe had intervened in the case it had assumed the status of an original party 
and was fully bound by all future court orders. See, id. at 1014. The holding in 
Oregon is logical because one who intervenes in a case is seel<ing to pursue a 
claim or to defend a particular position voluntarily. An intervenor is identical to an 
original plaintiff. Plaintiffs and intervenors are in any particular case because 
they consent to be in the case. Whether a plaintiff or intervenor1 they 
affirmatively sought to be a party. Were the Ute Tribe to bring an action in state 
court as a plaintiff, or were it to intervene, an argument that it had waived 
immunity could easily be made. The Ute Tribe in the present case did not 
voluntarily intervene, rather 1 it is an involuntary defendant in the action. Thus, the 
holding in Oregon has no bearing on this Court's decision. 
14.The Ute Tribe has only sought to have this case dismissed against it based on 
its sovereign immunity. Additionally the Tribe has asked the case not go forward 
against any defendant because the Tribe claims to be a necessary and 
indispensable party. The facts of this case do not parallel any of the cases the 
Plaintiffs have cited in support of their argument that sovereign immunity can be 
waived by a general appearance. Nor do the cases cited by the Plaintiffs support 
002050 
May 12, 2016 09:49 AM ADDENDUM PAGE 50 10 of 35 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the conclusion that a general appearance waives the sovereign immunity of a 
tribe. 
B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 
15.Next, the Defendants argue in the alternative, that the Plaintiffs' Verified 
Complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
The UTERO Ordinance requires the Plaintiffs to file a written complaint with the 
UTERO Commission prior to filing suit. The Defendants argue the Plaintiffs 
failed to do tl1is prior to filing the Verified Complaint. 
16.Tl1e Court will not decide this issue. The Court has already granted the 
Tribe's Motion to Dismiss, making this issue moot. Because this Court does not 
have jurisdiction over tile Tribe, whether or not tl1e Plaintiff adhered to the 
requirements of the UTERO Ordinance in bringing their claims is of no 
consequence to this Court. This Court would not have jurisdiction over the Tribe 
even if the Plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies. Additionally, 
the tribal court, if necessary, is better situated to determine if the Plaintiffs 
followed their procedures under the UTERO Ordinance. 
C. Necessary and Indispensable Party 
17.Finally, the Defendants argue the entire Verified Complaint must be dismissed 
as to all defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) because the Tribe is immune from 
suit and is a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19. 
18. Determining joinder of a party under rule 19 requires the court to potentially 
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make a three step analysts. First, the court must determine whether a party is 
necessary. Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734, 740 (Utah 2002). Next, the 
court must determine that joinder of the necessary party is feasible. Id. at 7 41. 
Finally, if the party is necessary and joinder is not feasible, the court must 
determine whether the party is indispensable. Id. 
19. Rule 19(a) of the Utal1 Rules of Civil Procedure states in part that a party is 
necessary if: 
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties. or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical 
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, 
or otheiwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. 
"The basic purpose of rule 19 is 'to protect the interests of absent persons as well as 
those already before the court from multiple litigation or inconsistent judicial 
determinations."' Landes v. City Capital Bank, 795 P .2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990); 
quoting 7 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 2d Section 1602, at 21 ( 1986). 
20.The Plaintiffs generally allege the Ute Tribe and the Tribe's governmental 
representatives have acted beyond the authority of the UTERO Ordinance and 
have committed torts against the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs insist that their claims 
do not rely on the UTERO Ordinance but are simple state tort, statutory, and 
constitutional law claims. The Plaintiffs claim the individual tribal representatives 
acted in their official capacities, although ultra vires, to commit wrongful acts 
against the Plaintiffs. Paragraphs 11, 12, 13 1 and 14 of Plaintiffs' prayer for relief 
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in the Amended Verified Complaint requests that the Court enjoin the Ute Tribe 
and UTE RO officials from actions that interfere with Plaintiffs1 abilities to conduct 
business. Paragraph 11 asks the Court to enjoin the Tribe and UTERO officials 
from regulating Plaintiffs' business activities in a manner that exceeds tribal 
aut11ority. Paragraph 12 asks for an injunction against wrongful interference with 
Plaintiffs' relationships with oil and gas companies. In part, paragraph 13 seeks 
to enjoin retaliation against Plaintiffs. And paragraph 14 seeks to enjoin 
retaliation against oil and gas companies that do business with Plaintiffs. 
21.The Court must first determine whether the Tribe is a necessary party within 
the meaning of U.R.C.P. 19. The inquiry is whether the Tribe claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the 
action in its absence may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to 
protect that interest. 
22.Any substantive analysis of the Plaintiffs' tort claims against UTERO officials 
would require the Court to make specific determinations regarding the ability of 
the Tribe to regulate tribal business relationships. For example, Plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint alleges that UTERO officials told Defendant Newfield that if 
Newfield utilized Plaintiffs' products or services, Newfield would be penalized 
and/or sanctioned to the fullest extent of tribal law. Plaintiffs characterize the 
Tribe's action in sending the communication as threatening, intimidating, 
retaliating, and wrongful, etc. In order for the Court to enjoin UTERO officials, 
and thereby enjoin the Tribe, from !:wrongfully interfering in Plaintiffs' relationship 
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with oil and gas companies,,: the Court would necessarily be required to 
determine whether the Tribe and its officials have authority to give such a 
directive to Nev/field and/or to other oil and gas companies. In essence, the 
question is whether the Tribe, througl1 its officials 1 may tell a company that the 
company may be precluded from operating on tribal lands if that company 
continues to engage in business with a particular individual or company. It 
seems apparent that a determination about whether the Tribe and its officials 
may issue directives relating to oil companies' business activities, such as the 
directive alleged to have been issued in this case, is a critical interest of the 
Tribe. Further1 injunctions against UTERO officials prohibiting them from issuing 
such directives effectively serves as an injunction against the Tribe from issuing 
those directives. The Court finds that such a disposition in this case, in the 
Tribe's absence, may as a practical matter impair or impede the Tribe's ability to 
protect that interest. Therefore, the Tribe is a necessary party to this action. 
23. However, as outlined above, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 
the Tribe, making joinder not feasible. Therefore, Rule 19(b) applies, and the 
Court must determine wl1etl1er the Tribe is indispensable. Rule 19(b) states: 
If a person described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the 
court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or sl1ould be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court 
include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might 
be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by 
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measure, 
the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in 
the person 1s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an 
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
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24.ln determining whether a judgment rendered in the Tribe=s absence might be 
prejudicial to the Tribe, the discussion above clearly implicates a probability of 
prejudice to the Tribe. Plaintiffs seek injunctions that would require the Tribe's 
officials to cease sending letters to oil and gas companies telling the companies 
that they face sanctions under the UTERO Ordinance if they continue to utilize 
Plaintiffs' products and services. A determination by the Court that tile UTERO 
officials' act of sending the directive to Newfield was wrongful is potentially 
prejudicial to the Tribe. An injunction against tribal officials is effectively an 
injunction against the Tribe. Such an injunction might limit the Tribe's ability to 
issue directives it deems necessary under the UTERO Ordinance and could be 
prejudicial to the Tribe's ability to regulate its affairs. Potentially, depending upon 
the Tribe's interpretations of its own laws, the Tribe could ban any person or 
company from doing business on Tribal ground for any reason. A judgment 
rendered by this Court in the Tribe's absence that purports to limit the Tribe's 
ability to sanction or exclude businesses from Tribal property for the reasons 
stated in tile alleged communication in this case creates a significant potential for 
prejudice against a key interest in tribal self-governance. 
25. Next, none of the parties have suggested how the Court could shape the relief 
or enter protective provisions in the judgment tl1at would lessen or avoid the 
prejudice described above. Neither can the Court conceive of any. Nearly all of 
the Plaintiffs' requests for relief ask for injunctions against the Tribe and UTERO 
officials. Conceptually, the Court cannot see how it could grant any version of 
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the relief requested that would not prejudice the Tribe. 
26.Further1 the Tribe and the UTERO officials are the key figures in this action. It 
is their alleged actions that constitute Plaintiffs' primary contention of 
wrongdoing. A judgment against the other Defendants, without the injunctions 
against the Tribe and its UTERO officials as demanded by Plaintiffs would seem 
to be an inadequate remedy. 
27.Finally, the Plaintiffs have anotl1er forum to address their claims other than in 
the State Court. Plaintiffs could have raised their claims through tribal 
administrative procedures and perhaps in the Tribal Court. The Plaintiffs argue 
that the Tribal Court is not neutral or fair. The Court sees such an allegation, 
without any factual basis, no differently than if Plaintiffs claimed the State's 
district or justice courts were inherently biased against a particular class of 
parties. 
28.The case contains claims which directly involve the Tribe 1s interests. The 
Tribe is immune from suit, and resolving the claims without the Tribe's presence 
would impair their ability to protect that interest. Consequently, the Tribe is a 
necessary and indispensable party to this action. 
29. Defendant Nevvfield has also sought dismissal for failure to join an 
indispensable party and that motion is best addressed here. Although similar, 
the necessary and indispensable analysis with regard to Newfield does merit 
some additional discussion. Rule 19 states that a party is a necessary party if 
11 he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that 
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the disposition of the action in his absence may ... (ii) leave any of the persons 
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 
other'1vise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest." 
30.Tl1e question then becomes whether a disposition of this action in the 
absence of the Tribe would leave Nevvfield subject to a substantial risk of 
inconsistent obligations by reason of the Tribe's claimed interest. The Tribe:s 
claimed interest is its ability to regulate business activity on tribal lands. That 
ability to regulate business activity might include issuing directives to oil and gas 
companies and imposing sanctions on companies for not abiding by the Tribe's 
directives. One potential disposition of this action is that the Court find NeVviield 
liable for one or more of the causes of action claimed by Plaintiffs and grant 
damages against Newfield. Simultaneously, because the Court has no subject 
matter jurisdiction over the Tribe to restrain the Tribe from any action relating to 
the directives it sends to oil and gas companies relating to business activities on 
tribal lands, and because the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to control 
the other means the Tribe uses to enforce its directives, Newfield could become 
subject to inconsistent obligations in State Court and before the UTERO 
Commission. If Ne\lvfield fails to abide by the directives of UTERO in an effort to 
avoid state legal claims that may be brought by Plaintiffs, Newfield may be 
subject to sanctions imposed by the Tribe. Likewise, if Newfield follows the 
directives of UTERO in an effort to maintain its status with the Tribe, to continue 
its ability to operate on tribal lands, and to avoid tribal sanctions, Newfield may 
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very conceivably be subject to further civil sanctions in State Court. 
31.Thus, disposition of this case in the Tribe's absence may leave Newfield 
subject to a substantial risk of incurring inconsistent obligations. In this context, 
the Tribe is a necessary party to the action. 
32. Whether the Tribe is an indispensable party from Newfield's perspective also 
merits additional discussion. Again, Rule 19(b) requires the Court to consider: (1) 
to what extent a judgment rendered in the Tribe's absence might be prejudicial to 
Newfield; (2) the extent to whict1 the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (3) 
whether a judgment rendered in the Tribe's absence will be adequate; (4) 
wt1ether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for 
nonjoinder. 
33.As discussed above, a judgment rendered in the Tribe's absence has 
significant potential to prejudice Nevvfield. A money judgment against Newfield is 
not simply a single judgment. In the Tribe's absence, Newfield could potentially 
be faced with a decision to risk further judgments in state court, face sanctions 
with the UTERO Commission, or cease its operations relating to tribal lands 
altogether. Because of the potential for inconsistent judgments between the 
state courts and the UTERO Commission, Newfield is placed in the untenable 
position of operating in potential violation of inconsistent directives from courts of 
two jurisdictions. 
34. The Court has been offered no solution to lessen or avoid this potential 
prejudice and, again, cannot conceive of any manner by which it could create a 
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ruling that would solve the potential prejudice potentially caused by Newfield 
being subject to conflicting and inconsistent orders from this Court and from the 
UTERO Commission. 
35.Factors relating to the indispensable status of a party numbered 3 and 4 are 
no different in the context of Newfield's position than they are in regard to the 
Tribe's position and need not be reiterated here. Consequently, the Tribe is a 
necessary and indispensable party to this action. 
36.Based upon the foregoing: 
1) The Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Brief, for Clarification of Order, and 
Related Relief is denied. 
2) The Tribe 1s motion to dismiss the Tribe for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction is granted. 
3) The Tribe's Motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party is 
granted. 
4) Newfield's Motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party is 
granted. 
II. Dismissal Motion of Newfield Defendants 
37.This matter also came before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Amended 
Verified Complaint filed by Defendants Newfield Production Company, Ne'1vfield 
Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC, and Newfield Drilling Services, Inc. 
("Newfield"). 
38.lnitially, the Court notes that based on the Court's decision on the Ute Tribe's 
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Motion to Dismiss! this matter is also dismissed against the Newfield Defendants. 
The Court found that the Ute Tribe was a necessary and indispensable party to 
this action. However, the Ute Tribe is immune from suit. Consequently, the 
matter cannot be maintained against Newfield either. The Court adopts that 
decision here. While that decision makes the additional arguments moot, the 
Court will address the additional arguments as an alternative basis to dismiss the 
Amended Verified Complaint. 
39.The Defendants move the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule 12(b)(6) 
defense is a challenge to the plaintiffs right to relief based on the facts the 
plaintiff has alleged in the complaint. Russell v. Standard Co1p., 898 P.2d 263 
(Utah 1995). 
40.The court reviews a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to determine whether the plaintiff 
would be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in 
support of its claims. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P .2d 107 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). The court must "accept the factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Alvarez v. Ga/etka, 933 P.2d 987, 989 
(Utah 1997). 
41."[T]o support a claim for relief. a plaintiff 'must have alleged sufficient facts ... 
to satisfy each element' of a claim.·'1 Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 2013 UT App 26, 
paragraph 16, 296 P.3d 760 (quoting MBNA Am. Bank N.A. v. Goodman, 2006 
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UT App 2761 paragraph 61 140 P.3d 589). ''[W]hen the pleader complains of 
conduct described by ... general terms . . . the allegation of the conclusion is 
not sufficient; the pleading must describe the nature or substance of the acts or 
words complained of." Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 
1982). 11[G]eneral accusations in the nature of conclusions ... will not stand up 
against a motion to dismiss." Heathman v. Hatch 1 372 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 
1962); Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Bosch, 4 75 P .2d 1019, 1020 (Utah 1970). 
42.The Plaintiffs allege that the Newfield Defendants have conspired with the 
other Defendants to boycott or blacklist the PlaintiffsI business. The Plaintiffs 
claim the Newfield Defendants are liable for tortious interference with economic 
relations, extortion, unlawful restraint of tradeI blacklisting, and civil conspiracy. 
The factual allegations the Plaintiffs rely on to support their claims against 
Newfield are made in paragraphs 70-7 4 in the Amended Verified Complaint, 
which states: 
70. Since the March 201 2013! threats by Director WopsockI the oil and 
gas companies, including Newfield, have refused to allow any business 
who leases Plaintiffs' equipment or utilizes Plaintiffs' Products to provide 
services. 
71. By email dated March 22, 2013, Newfield informed Ryan that it would 
not be utilizing PlaintiffsI products or services per the direction of the 
"UTERO committee." 
72. Newfield's and other oil and gas companies' cooperation with the 
unlawful and ultra vires actions of tribal officials empowers said officials 
and is the direct and proximate cause of damages to Plaintiffs. 
73. Since March 20131 Plaintiffs' have lost approximately $80,000.00 per 
day in revenues the result of Newfield and other oil and gas companies 
cooperating in the unlawful UTERO blacklist and boycott of Plaintiffs. 
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7 4. Ryan has been contacted by oil and gas companies. including 
Newfield, and told that they cannot do business with Plaintiffs or work with 
anyone that does business with Plaintiffs based on their cooperation with 
and support of the UTERO officials. 
43.The Plaintiffs also submitted attachments to a Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order which was filed at the same time as the original Complaint. 
The attachments concern communications that UTERO had with Newfield 
concerning Rocks Off, and Ne\1vfield's notification to Plaintiff that Newfield would 
no longer be utilizing the Plaintiff on jobs. The parties referenced these 
attachments in the subsequent motions. Although foundation was never 
provided for the documents, none of the parties objected to the attachments on 
an evidentiary basis. Nor did any of the parties oppose the Court's consideration 
of the attachments in conjunction with deciding the Motions. 
44.The March 20, 2013, UTERO letter notified Ne\ivfield that the access permit 
for Rocks Off, Inc. - Ryan Harvey had been revoked. The letter indicated that 
companies doing business on the reservation may be penalized or sanctioned for 
using Rocks Off, Inc. - Ryan Harvey. In response to the letter, a representative 
of Newfield notified Ryan Harvey by email that Newfield would not be using 
Rocks Off, Inc., due to the UTERO directive. 
45.The facts set forth in the Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint establish, at 
most, that Newfield was notified by UTERO that Rocks Off's access permit had 
been revoked and were no longer autt1orized to conduct work on tribal land, and 
that Newfield followed that directive by no longer utilizing Rocks Off for work on 
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tribal land. Those minimal factual allegations fail to support the various claims 
the Plaintiffs set forth. The facts do not support a finding that Newfield and the 
other Defendants came to a meeting of the minds to harm the Plaintiffs) 
business. The facts do not support a claim that Nevvfield agreed to assist in 
harming the Plaintiffs' business. The complaint must give the defendant 'ifair 
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim .... 11 Zoumadakis v. 
Uintah Basin Med. Ctr., 2005 UT App 325, paragraph 2, 122 P .3d 891. The 
factual allegations made against Nevvfield fail to provide adequate notice of the 
actions complained of. For that reason, and for the reasons listed below, the 
Defendant Newfield's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
A. Tortious Interference with Economic Relations 
46.The elements of a claim for tortious interference with economic relations 
include "(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs' existing 
or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper 
means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff_:, Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 
657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants ahave 
intentionally interfered with the Plaintiffs' existing and potential economic 
relations.)! (Am. Campi., at paragraph 117.). The Plaintiffs do not provide any 
explanation of the Defendants: actions or facts to support their claim. "[G]eneral 
accusations in the nature of conclusions ... will not stand up against a motion to 
dismiss." Heathman, 13 Utah 2d at 268, 372 P.2d at 991. The allegations are 
insufficient to provide the Defendants fair notice of tl1e actions complained of. 
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Therefore 1 the Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief against Nevvfield is dismissed. 
B. Extortion 
47.Utah does not recognize a civil claim for extoriion. See Jensen v. America's 
Wholesale Lender, Case No. 1:09-cv-169 TS, 2010 WL 2720745 (D. Utah July 
81 2010) (unpublished); see also Whipple v. State of Utah, Case No. 2: 1 0-cv-811 
OAK, 2011 WL 4368568 *17 (D. Utah Aug. 25, 2011) (Report and 
Recommendation) (unpublished) ("Thus, because a private right of action does 
not exist in Utah for theft and theft by exto,iion, the court recommends that 
Plaintiff's third cause of action [for "extortion"] be dismissed.'} Consequently, the 
Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief for extortion is dismissed. 
C. Antitrust Claim 
48.The Plaintiffs allege in their Fifth Claim for Relief that the Defendants 
conspired witl1 the other Defendants in violation of Utah's Antitrust Act and the 
Utah Const. Art. XII, Section 20. The Utah Antitrust Act explicitly adopts and 
follows interpretations of federal antitrust laws. See Section 76-10-3118. A 
violation of the Sherman Act "requires that there be a contract, 
combination ... or conspiracy ... ; [i]ndependent action is not proscribed." 
Section 76-10-3104 of the Utah Antitrust Act requires that "[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or 
commerce is declared to be illegal." A claim for violation of the antitrust laws 
requires pleading facts showing a concerted effort among the defendants. In 
002064 
May ·12, 2016 09:49 AM ADDENDUM PAGE 64 24 of 35 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah, the facts must support "a 'meeting of the minds' on a common 'object or 
course of action.Ill Tomlinson, 2013 UT App 26 at paragraph 19 (quoting 
Petersen v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, paragraph 121 42 P.3d 1253. 
49.The Plaintiffs offer no facts alleging that Newfield and the other Defendants 
had a meeting of the minds to boycott the Plaintiffs' business. All that is alleged is 
UTERO infom1ed Newfield that Rocks Off was no longer allowed to conduct 
business on tribal land, and Newfield relayed the message to the Plaintiffs 
explaining that Newfield was not going to do business with Plaintiffs due to the 
UTERO notice. The Plaintiffs' claim merely recites the elements of an antitrust 
claim. "[A] complaint is subject to dismissal where it does little more than recite 
the relevant antitrust laws" and 11the use of antitrust buzz words does not supply 
the factual circumstances necessary to support conclusory allegations." Tai v. 
Hogan, 453 F.3d 12441 1261 (10th Cir. 2006). The Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for 
Relief against Newfield is dismissed. 
D. Blacklisting 
SO.The Plaintiffs' claim for blacklisting is derived from Article XII Section 19 and 
Article XVI Section 4 of the Utah Constitution. Article XII Section 19 provides: 
Each person in Utah is free to obtain and enjoy employment whenever 
possible and a person or corporation, or their agent, servant 1 or employee 
may not maliciously interfere with any person from obtaining employment 
or enjoying employment from any other person or corporation. 
Article XVI Section 4 states: 
The exchange of blacl< lists by railroad companies, or otl1er corporations) 
associations or persons is prohibited. 
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The Plaintiffs Amended Verified Complaint fails to allege facts concerning the exchange 
of blacklists, or malicious interference with Plaintiffs' employment, on the part of 
Newfield. The pied facts allege Newfield received an email from UTERO concerning 
Rocks Off, and in compliance with the UTERO Ordinance governing work done on tribal 
grounds, Newfield no longer used Rock Off as a contractor or subcontractor. The facts 
allege that Newfield followed the direction of UTERO by not using the Plaintiff for work 
completed on tribal land because the Plaintiff was no longer licensed to do work on 
tribal land. The Plaintiffs: cause of action for blacklisting is dismissed. 
E. Civil Conspiracy 
51.A civil conspiracy claim requires "(1) a combination of two or more persons, 
(2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or 
course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a 
proximate result thereof." Estrada v. Mendoza, 2012 UT App 82, paragraph 13, 
275 P.3d 1024, 1029. A civil conspiracy claim also !(requires as one its essential 
elements, underlying tort,'' and "a plaintiff is obligated to plead the existence of 
such a tort." Id. The Plaintiffs" Amended Verified Complaint does not allege any 
facts concerning an underlying tort. Nor have the Plaintiffs alleged any facts 
showing Newfield and the other Defendants came to a meeting of the minds to 
commit an unlavvful act against the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' Seventh 
Claim for Relief is dismissed. 
52. The Newfield Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
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Ill. Dismissal Motion of Defendants D. Ray Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsock, 
and Jackie LaRose, LaRose Construction Company, Inc .• 
and D. Ray C. Enterprises. L.L.C. 
53. This matter also came before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
or in the Alternative Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Verified 
Complaint filed by Defendants D. Ray Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsock, and Jackie 
LaRose ("individual Defendants"), in their individual capacities, and as 
representatives of the Ute Indian Tribe 1 and LaRose Construction Company, Inc., 
and D. Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. 
54.The individual Defendants offer many of the same arguments made by the 
Tribe in their Motion to Dismiss The Court adopts its decision on the Tribe's 
Motion to Dismiss in as far as the two Motions overlap. Specifically, the Court 
finds that the Tribe is a necessary and indispensable party which is immune from 
suit. Consequently, the case is dismissed for that reason, as well as the 
additional reasons listed below. The Courf s decision here will address the 
arguments the individual Defendants offer that differ from the Tribe's. 
A. D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose Construction 
55.The Plaintiffs have asserted claims against D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose 
Construction, apart from the claims made against the businesses' owners, 
Defendants Dino Ray Cesspooch and Jackie LaRose. "To support a claim for 
relief, a plaintiff 'must have alleged sufficient facts ... to satisfy each element' of 
a claim." Tomlinson v. NCR Corp . ., 296 P.3d 760 (Utah App. 2013), superseded 
on other grounds, 2014 UT 53, 345 P.2d 523 (Utah 2014) (quoting MBNA Am. 
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Bank N.A. v. Goodman1 140 P.3d 589 1 591 (Utah App. 2006)). The Plaintiffs' 
Amended Verified Complaint does not assert any facts supporting the claims 
made against these two corporate Defendants. The Amended Verified 
Complaint only alleges facts regarding the individual Defendants' actions as 
individuals and as government officials of tile Tribe. Consequently, the Plaintiffs 
have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against these i'No 
corporate Defendants. The Amended Verified Complaint is dismissed pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(6) for the Defendants D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose 
Construction. 
B. Dino Ray Cesspooch, Jackie LaRose, and Sheila Wopsock 
56.The next issue is whether suit can be maintained against the individual 
Defendants, or if sovereign immunity bars the suit. The Plaintiffs' claims are 
brought against the individual Defendants both in their individual capacity and in 
their capacity as governmental officials of the Tribe. The Defendants argue 
sovereign immunity applies to them as government officials of the Tribe. The 
Plaintiffs argue that sovereign immunity does not apply because the actions 
taken by the officials were outside the scope of their governmental authority. 
57.The Ute Tribe's sovereign immunity does not apply to the individual 
Defendants acting in their individual capacities. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't 
of Game of State of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 173, 97 S. Ct. 2616, 2621 (1977) 
C'[t]he successful assertion of tribal sovereign immunity in tl1is case does not 
impair the authority of the state court to adjudicate the rights of the individual 
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defendants over \Nhom it properly obtained personal jurisdiction.'} In Max~ve/1 v. 
Cty. of San Diego, the 9th Circuit considered whether paramedics employed by 
the Viejas Band's fire department were immune from suit for actions committed 
by the paramedics in their individual capacities. 708 F .3d 1075, 1089 (9th Cir. 
2013). The court held sovereign immunity did not bar the suit against the 
paramedics individually because the tribe was not the real party in interest1 and 
money damages would not be paid from t11e tribal treasury. Id. 
58.The determining factor in deciding whether a tribe's sovereign immunity 
extends to the tribe's government officials is whether the sovereign "is the real, 
substantial party in interest." Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d 1247, 1253 (10th Cir. 
2001 ). Whether a tribe is the real party in interest is decided by looking at the 
relief sought. Id. "[T]he general rule is that relief sought nominally against an 
officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the 
latter." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 900 
(1984). Conversely, sovereign immunity does not bar the suit if the relief sought 
is only against the individual tribal officer personally. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 757 1 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999). 
59.Here, the relief sought by the Plaintiffs indicates that the Ute Tribe is the real 
party in interest. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief against the Tribe, UTERO; 
and the UTERO officials. The Plaintiffs request the Court issue a declaratory 
order limiting the Tribe, UTERO, and UTERO officials from regulating private 
business activities of non-Indians outside of the tribal land. This type of relief 
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directly involves the Tribe, not the individual Defendants personally. The Plaintiffs 
also seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Tribe, UTERO, and UTERO officials, 
from acting in a way which interferes with the Plaintiffs' business. Again, this type 
of relief only applies to tl1e Tribe and the Tribe's officials and not the individual 
Defendants. The relief Plaintiffs are seeking is against the Tribe. Therefore, the 
Tribe is the real party in interest and sovereign immunity also applies to the 
individual Defendants. 
60.Even assuming that the individual Defendants are being sued in their 
individual capacities, and the Plaintiffs were not seeking damages from the Tribe, 
the case must still be dismissed. The Plaintiffs allege that the UTERO officials 
acted beyond the scope of authority given them to regulate business on tribal 
land. The authority given to the UTERO officials to regulate business in their 
jurisdiction derives from the UTERO Ordinance. Whether the UTERO officials 
exceeded the scope of authority given to them by the UTERO Ordinance 
necessarily requires examining and interpreting the UTERO Ordinance. 
Interpreting tribal laws is outside the scope of a state district court's general 
jurisdiction. "Adjudication of such matters by any nontribal court also infringes 
upon tribal law-making authority, because tribal courts are best qualified to 
interpret and apply tribal law." Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaP/ante, 107 S.Ct. 971, 977 
(1987). 
61.The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. The claims asserted against 
Defendants D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose Construction are dismissed 
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pursuant to Rule 12(b )(6). The claims asserted against the individual Defendants 
are dismissed pursuant Rule 12(b )(I). 
IV. Plaintiffs' Motion to File Supplemental Pleadings 
62. This matter also came before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to File 
Supplemental Pleadings. 
63.The Plaintiffs request to be allowed to supplement their pleadings to include 
events which have taken place since the inception of this lawsuit. The Plaintiffs 
make this request pursuant to Rule 1 S(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which states in part: 
Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon 
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading 
setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened 
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. 
A rule 15(d) motion is "addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and leave to 
serve a supplemental pleading 'should be liberally granted unless good reason exists 
for denying leave, such as prejudice to defendants.Ill Southwest Nurseries, LLC v. 
Florists Mutual lnsurance1 Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1256 (D. Colo. 2003) (quoting 
Walker v. United Parcel Setv., Inc., 240 F.3d 1268, 1278 (1 Qti, Cir. 2001 )). "Refusing 
leave to amend is generally only justified upon a showing of undue delay, undue 
prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies 
by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment." Frank v. U.S. Wes( Inc., 
3 F.3d 13571 1365 (1 oth Cir. 1993). 
64.The Plaintiffs' Motion is a clear attempt to bolster their chances of surviving 
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the various motions to dismiss filed by the Defendants. The three motions made 
by the Defendants have been fully briefed and submitted for decision. The Court 
heard oral argument on all of the motions on January 29 1 2016. Based on the 
extensive briefing in those motions, it is apparent that the parties spent a 
considerable amount of time and effort producing them. The Court also spent a 
considerable amount of time and effort researching and reviewing the arguments. 
The Defendants' motions were also pending for an extended period of time. The 
Defendants including the UTERO officials made their first motion to dismiss on 
May 1, 2013. The Newfield Defendants made their motion to dismiss on July 7, 
2014. The Ute Tribe made their motion on December 16, 2015. Attempting to 
insert new factual allegations into the pleadings after the passage of this amount 
of time, after the effort to produce the motions, and hold oral argument, would be 
unjust. 
65.The Defendants would be unduly prejudiced by allm,ving the pleadings to be 
amended in effort to defeat their motions to dismiss. The Plaintiffs initiated this 
lawsuit nearly three years ago. The Defendants have been waiting nearly that 
long to have their motions considered. Requiring the Defendants to remake their 
motions, and to wait longer to have the motions resolved 1 would be unjust. The 
Plaintiffs had an opportunity to draft their complaint as they saw fit. The Plaintiffs 
were given an additional opportunity to amend their complaint on September 4, 
2013. The Plaintiffs literally had years to amend their pleadings in light of the 
Defendants' motions. Allowing the Plaintiffs an additional opportunity to defeat 
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the pending motions is not allowed by rules regarding motion pleading, and 
would be an unjust result. 
66.Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs' Motion is moot. The Court granted the 
Defendants' motions, dismissing this matter in its entirety. Tile Court provided 
various reasons for dismissing the matter, including the fact that the Ute Tribe 
was a necessary and indispensable party to this action. Sovereign immunity 
applies to the Ute Tribe. Therefore) the lawsuit cannot be maintained in a state 
district court. Furthermore, this lawsuit requires this Court to analyze and 
interpret the Ute Tribe's UTERO ordinance. A state district court does not have 
jurisdiction over a sovereign, nor can it interpret the laws of the sovereign. None 
of the factual allegations offered by the Plaintiffs changes that result. Even if the 
Court were to allow the Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their pleadings, the 
outcome would be the same. The matter would be dismissed. 
67.Additionally, the Plaintiffs' Motion does not explain how the various factual 
allegations are relevant, or how they apply to the claims. The Motion is simply a 
list of the factual allegations the Plaintiffs allege have occurred since the 
inception of this action. The Plaintiffs suggest that the Court examine the factual 
allegations and determine which ones may be relevant in deciding the motions to 
dismiss. The Court declines the Plaintiffs' invitation. The Plaintiffs' responsibility 
is to offer the facts and explain how they apply to the claims, and to the 
arguments made. 
68. The Plaintiffs' Motion to File Supplemental Pleadings is denied. 
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WHEREFORE, the Amended Verified Complaint and all claims raised therein are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
[Signature of Court appears at top of first page.] 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
John D. Hancock 
Clark B. Allred 
Brad D. Brotherson 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
/s/ Ryan R. Jibson 
Christopher R. Hogle 
Ryan R. Jibson 
[Signed with permission of 
Mr. Jibson received by email] 
Attorneys for Defendants Newfield 
Production Company, Newfield Rocky 
Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC, 
and Newfield Drilling Services, Inc. 
Patrick S. Boice 
Attorney for Defendants D. Ray 
Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsock, and 
Jackie LaRose, in their official 
capacities 
/s/ Daniel S. Press 
Daniel S. Press 
Craig H. Howe 
[Signed with permission of Mr. Press 
received by email] 
Attorneys for Defendants D. Ray 
Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsock, and 
Jackie LaRose, in their individual 
capacities, and LaRose Construction 
Company, Inc., and D. Ray C. 
Enterprises, L.L.C. 
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed 
JUDGMENT to be electronically served this 19ui day of April, 2016 upon the following: 
John D. Hancock Christopher R. Hogle 
JOHN D. HANCOCK LAW GROUP Ryan R. Jibson 
72 North 300 East, Suite A (123~13) HOLLAND & HART 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 222 So. Main Street, Ste. 2200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Clark B. Allred Craig H. Howe 
ALLRED, BROTHERSON & MILLER TOONE 
HARINGTON 165 Regent Street 
72 North 300 East Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
Calvin M. Hatch Daniel S. Press 
Patrick S. Boice VAN NESS FELDMAN 
HATCH & BOICE 1050 Thomas Jefferson St., NW 
1457 East 3300 South Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 Washington, DC 20007 
/s/ J. Preston Stieff 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
RYAN URESK HARVEY, ROCKS 




UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH 
and OURAY RESERVATION, et al., 
Defendants/ Appellees. 
Appellate Case No.: 20160362-CA 
On Appeal from the Eighth District Court for Duchesne County - Roosevelt 
Honorable Judge Samuel P. Chiara 
Trial Case No. 130000009 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Pursuant to Utah R. of Appellate Procedure 24 (a)(l): 
A. Plaintiffs 
Ryan Harvey ("Ryan") is an individual domiciled in and doing business in 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties, Utah. 
Rocks Off, Inc., ("Rocks Off") is a Utah corporation doing business in Duchesne 
and Uintah Counties, Utah. 
Wildcat Rentals, Inc., ("Wildcat") is a Utah corporation doing business in 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties, Utah. 
Plaintiffs are referred to collectively as (the "Harvey Parties"). 
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B. Defendants 
The Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation ("Tribe") is a federally 
recognized tribe with reservation lands located in Uintah and Duchesne Counties, Utah. 
Dino Cesspooch ("Commissioner Cesspooch"), is an appointed Ute Tribal 
Employment Rights Office ("UTERO") Commissioner of the Ute Tribe, and is sued in 
his individual as well as his official capacity. Jackie LaRose ("Commissioner LaRose"), 
is an appointed UTERO Commissioner of the 
Ute Tribe, and is sued in his individual as well as his official capacity. 
Sheila Wopsock ("Director Wopsock"), is the appointed Director of the UTERO 
Commission, and is sued in her individual as well as her official capacity. 
Newfield Production Company is a Delaware corporation engaged in the 
exploration, development and production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids 
with production regions, employees, operations, and doing business, in Duchesne and 
Uintah Counties, Utah. 
Newfield Rocky Mountain, Inc. is a Delaware corporation engaged in the 
exploration, development and production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids 
with production regions, employees, operations, and doing business, in Duchesne and 
Uintah Counties, Utah. 
Newfield RMI, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company engaged in the 
exploration, development and production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids 
with production regions, employees, operations, and doing business, in Duchesne and 
Uintah Counties, Utah. 
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Newfield Drilling Services, Inc. is a Utah corporation engaged in the exploration, 
development and production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids with 
production regions, employees, operations, and doing business, in Duchesne and Uintah 
Counties, Utah. 
Newfield Production Company, Newfield Rocky Mountain, Inc., Newfield RMI, 
LLC, and Newfield Drilling Services, Inc. are collectively referred to herein as 
("Newfield 11 ). 
L.C. Welding & Construction, Inc. ("L.C. Welding") is a Utah corporation. 
Scamp Excavation, Inc. ("Scamp") is a Utah corporation. 
Huffman Enterprises, Inc. ("Huffman") is a Utah corporation. 
LaRose Construction Company, Inc. ("LaRose") is a Utah corporation. 
D. Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. ("D. Ray Enterprises") is a Utah limited liability 
company. 
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